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Summary
A methodology for designing a failure-detection and identification (FDI) system to detect
and isolate control-element failures in aircraft control systems has been developed by Weiss and
Hsu (NASA CR-178213), and this methodology has been extended to an adaptive FDI system.
In this methodology, the failures are divided into two categories, aircraft path and actuator
path, based on failure location, and an FDI subsystem is designed for each path. The actuator
path includes those failures that occur between the flight computer output and the measurement
of actuator position at the actuator output. The aircraft path includes those failures outboard
of the actuator position measurement, such as damage to a control surface. The aircraft-
path technique uses a linear model of the aircraft aerodynamics and the nonlinear equations of
motion in an analytical redundancy scheme to generate residuals that are processed in decision
algorithms to detect and isolate the failures. Hence, the design is for use at a single aircraft
operating point. The actuator path similarly uses a separate simplified nonlinear model of the
actuator and a decision algorithm for each surface, and thus the system is called a decentralized
FDI system. The structure of the decision algorithms is selected by using a simplified design
model of the residuals; values for the algorithm parameters, such as thresholds, are then based
on a more accurate truth model of the residuals. The decentralized concept and the use of
design and truth models are key to the robustness of the methodology.
Using this methodology, a baseline FDI system design for a modified Boeing 737 airplane was
produced by Weiss. In this report, the Weiss system, or baseline design, was evaluated in detail
by using a six-degree-of-freedom nonlinear simulation of the airplane, including atmospheric
turbulence based on the Dryden model. When operated in a no-turbulence environment, the
actuator-path subsystem performed very well. All actuator-path failures---stuck at neutral,
stuck at current position, and hardover--were detected in a timely manner, and in the no-
failure simulation runs, there were no actuator-path false alarms. The aircraft-path subsystem
also performed well in zero turbulence. There were no false alarms, and partially missing surface
failures of the stabilizer, rudder, elevator, and aileron were all detected when the remaining
surface effectiveness was 60 percent. The right-stabilizer failure was isolated to the fictitious
right horizontal tail, since the system cannot distinguish between stabilizer and elevator failures
because of their identical effects.
When the actuator-path subsystem was evaluated in simulation with model errors in the
range of 5 to 15 percent, stuck-at-current-position failures were reliably detected without false
alarms. With larger model errors (12.5 to 37.5 percent), the same failures were detected, but
some false alarms were experienced. When the aircraft-path subsystem was operated at trim
points in the vicinity of the design point, aircraft-path failures were reliably detected with no
false alarms, but isolation performance was slightly degraded. At a trim point farther away
(cruise instead of terminal area), the system was unusable because of false alarms. When
moderate random errors were added to the aircraft-path model, the system was still able to
detect failures at 60-percent effectiveness, but two false alarms occurred.
In 10-ft/sec turbulence, the actuator-path subsystem continued to perform well. Again, all
actuator-path failures were detected with no false alarms. On the other hand, the baseline
aircraft-path subsystem was completely unusable in 10-ft/sec and higher turbulence because of
the large number of false alarms. Examination of the residuals indicated that many of the error
standard deviations used in the truth model were too small. Thus, new values for the truth
model in 10-ft/sec turbulence were obtained, and two new aircraft-path subsystem designs
(threshold (TG) and projection vector at 10-ft/sec turbulence (PV10)) were produced. Both of
these new designs performed well in 10-ft/sec turbulence, far superior to the baseline design in
false-alarmperformance.However,performanceof thenewdesignsin zeroturbulencewasnot
nearlyasgoodasthat of the baselinedesign,sosometypeof adaptivedesignwasnecessaryfor
operationin atmosphericturbulence.
Whena newaircraft-pathsubsystem(projectionvectorat 20-ft/secturbulence(PV20))was
designedfor operationin 20-ft/secturbulence,the standarddeviationsof the errors for the
truth modelobtainedin 20-ft/secwindgustshadto beincreasedto obtainadequatefalse-alarm
performanceat that turbulencelevel. Thus,it appearsthat, at the higherturbulencelevels,
thedesignprocedureneedsrefinementor that themethodof obtainingparametervaluesfor the
truth modelneedsimprovement.Nevertheless,after the truth modelwasadjusted,the PV20
designperformedverywell in 20-ft/secgusts.
Thedesignprocedurewasextendedto producean interpolateddesignfor operationovera
rangeof turbulencelevels.Thiswasaccomplishedby linearlyinterpolatingthethresholds,gains,
andprojectionvectorsbetweentheir baseline,PV10,andPV20designvaluesbasedona priori
knowledgeof theturbulencelevel.Theinterpolateddesignperformedwelloverthe turbulence
rangeof 0 to 20ft/sec. However,in actualflight, this a priori knowledgeof theturbulencelevel
is not available,andanestimateof the turbulenceis required.
A turbulenceestimatorbasedon the techniqueusedin the NASA F-8 digital fly-by-wire
programwasdeveloped.This techniqueestimatesthe samplestandarddeviationof the latest
5 secof turbulence.This estimatorwascombinedwith the interpolateddesignto producean
adaptiveaircraft-pathsubsystem.This adaptivedesignwasevaluatedin 0-, 5-, 10-,15-,and
20-ft/secturbulenceand performedwell overthe entire range. It successfullydetectedand
isolatedall partially missingsurfacefailuresat 40-percenteffectiveness,andit detected19out
of 20 failuresat 60-percenteffectiveness.Only at the smallestfailuremagnitude(80-percent
effectiveness)did performancedegrade.Furthermore,in 688secof simulationtime with no
failures,therewasonly onefalsealarm.
AlthoughthedecentralizedFDI techniqueisrobustto smallmodelerrors,andthe extension
of thetechniqueto anadaptivesystemallowsthesystemto operatein atmosphericturbulence,
problemsremainto besolvedin the developmentof anoperationalFDI system.Thetwo most
urgentneedsare (1) thecontinuationof workto extendthesystemfromasingleoperatingpoint
to operationoverthe entireoperatingenvelopeof the aircraft and (2) flight testingto provide
morerealisticnoise,or error, valuesfor the truth modelsand to providereliablefalse-alarm
evaluation.
Introduction
For certainanticipatedfailuresin the operationof transport aircraft, thereareestablished
proceduresfor the pilot to follow. A typical exampleis the procedurefor handlingan engine
outageduringtakeoff.Thereare,however,unanticipatedfailuremodesforwhichnoappropriate
emergencyproceduresareavailable.Theseunanticipatedfailuresmustbehandledby the pilot
and/or theautomaticcontrolsystemin realtimeto decreasetheprobabilityof a tragicaccident.
In the caseof a hardover(maximumsurfacedeflection)failure in a control element,the
pilot mayhaveonly a matter of secondsto takecorrectiveactionbeforethe aircraft reaches
an irrecoverablecondition. In the caseof a failure of lessermagnitude,the pilot may have
moretime to take correctiveaction,but the failure and,hence,the propercorrectiveaction
may bedifficult to identify. In either case, the pilot may require assistance from the aircraft
systems to help determine the appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. A restructurable
flight control system (RFCS) is designed to provide such assistance in these emergencies. The
RFCS automatically restructures the control system to utilize the remaining useful control
effectorsto recoverfrom theemergencyandto providestability andcontrolaugmentationwhen
sufficientcontrolpowerremains.A crucialcomponentof theRFCSis the failure-detectionand
identification(FDI) system,whichdetectstheoccurrenceof a control-elementfailure,identifies
the failedelements,andprovidesneededfailure informationto the otherRFCScomponents.
A considerableamountof workhasbeendonein the areaof failuredetectionandidentifica-
tion in dynamicsystems,andWillsky hasprovidedawell-knownsurveyof manyofthe available
FDI techniques(ref. 1). Chow(ref.2)andChowandWillsky (ref.3)haveexaminedtheproblem
of generatingresidualsfromthe systemmeasurementdatafor usein decision-makingprocesses
to detectand identify failures. The detectionof failuresin sensorshasbeeninvestigatedin
references4 to 7. The generalizedlikelihoodratio hasbeeninvestigatedfor FDI applications
in references8 to 18. This techniquehasbeenexercisedin a simplifiedsimulationof the F-8
aircraftdynamics(refs.9 to 12), in a linearsimulationof the Boeing737aircraft longitudinal
dynamics(ref. 18), and in a six-degree-of-freedomnonlinearsimulationof the C-130aircraft
(refs.15to 17).AnotherFDI techniqueis the failure-detectionfilter. Beard(ref. 19)developed
the theoryof the failure-detectionfilter for lineardeterministiccontinuoussystemsby usinga
matrix-algebraapproach.Jones(ref. 20)extendedthis theory to stochasticand sampleddata
systemsby usinga vectorspaceapproach.Meserole(ref. 21)hasappliedthe failure-detection
filter to the problemof detectingandidentifyingfailuresin anF-100jet engine.This technique
hasbeenappliedto the problemof detectingandidentifyingcontrol-elementfailuresin aircraft
in references15and 22 for the C-130and 737,respectively.Early workon restructurableor
reconfigurableflight control systemswasdoneby BoudreauandBerman(ref. 23). In a later
effort, Caglayanet al. (ref. 24) investigatedRFCSdesign. Their FDI approachwasto use
a Kalmanfilter followedby a bankof first-orderfilters and likelihood-ratiocomputersand a
multiple-hypothesistest.
Oneofthedifficultieswith theFDI techniquespreviouslymentionedistheir lackofrobustness
to model errors. Weissand his colleagues(refs. 25 to 27) havedevelopedan FDI design
methodologyaimedat improvingthis robustnessto modelerrors. Like the aforementioned
techniques,this approach,whichthey call decentralizedFDI, utilizesanalytical redundancy.
However,unlike the previousapproacheswhichusea centralfilter, their techniqueusesonly
the mostreliableinformationin theseanalytical-redundancyrelationships,andthus increases
robustnesswith only a smalllossin optimality. Theyhaveappliedthis techniqueto transport
aircraft (refs.25 to 29),high-performanceaircraft (refs.30 and 31),andjet engines(refs.32
and33). A forerunnerof this approachwasusedin the NASAF-8 digital fly-by-wireprogram
(ref. 34)to detectsensorfailures.
Theprimarypurposesof this reportareto presentamorethoroughevaluationviasimulation
oftheperformanceof Weiss'sFDI designthanwascontainedin reference25,includingtheeffects
of atmosphericturbulenceandmodelerrors;to describeanextensionto Weiss'sdesign,namely,
an adaptiveFDI system,for operationin turbulence;and to presenta simulationevaluation
of this adaptivesystem.Secondarypurposesof this report are to presenta reviewof Weiss's
designmethodologyfor completenessandto presentadditionaldetailsconcerninga fewareas
of the designthat arenot foundin reference25.
The report is organizedasfollows:The designconcept,or methodology,is presentedfirst,
followedby numericalresultsfrom the designprocedurefor the baselinesystemdesignedby
Weiss. Resultsof a thoroughsimulationevaluationof the baselinedesignarenext, followed
by modificationsto the designfor operationin turbulenceandresultsof anevaluationof these
modifications.A descriptionandanevaluationof analgorithmto estimatethelevel (standard
deviation)of turbulencearethenpresented,followedby adescriptionof anadaptiveFDI design
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and a presentationof the resultsof anevaluationof this design.The final sectioncontainsa
summaryof resultsandconclusions.
Symbols
Somevariablesaxelisted with the generalsubscript_. In thesecases,specificsubscripts
aredefinedunderthe subheading"Subscripts."Bold capitalletters indicatematrices,andbold
lower-caseletters indicatevectors.A dot overa symbolindicatesa derivativewith respectto
time. An asteriskovera symbolindicatesanaveragedquantity.
A
Am_
AC_
a
aM
al
B
Bj
b
cs( )
d 2
Ewc
EPR
fs
fsi
G
GA, GD
GE
system transition matrix
accelerometer measurement, ft/sec 2
accelerometer measurement after compensation for off-center-of-
gravity effects, ft/sec 2
acceleration, ft/sec 2
filter constant for high-pass filter in error model
filter constant for low-pass filter in error model
system input, or control, matrix
jth column of B matrix
reference wing span, ft
nondimensional aerodynamic coefficient
constant term in series expansion of C'_ accounting for forces or
moments at trim condition
C_ with respect to (derivative of
failure isolated to confusion set consisting of surfaces listed in
parentheses
reference wing chord, ft
metric defined by equation (36)
worst-case error, deg
engine pressure ratio
accelerometer measurement error, ft/sec 2
pass-fail flag for ith failure test
effective failure magnitude, deg
minimum failure magnitude to achieve desired value of d 2 metric,
deg
gain in turbulence estimator
SPRT gains
turbulence estimator gain
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g,g
H
Hi
H1
H0
Izx
Ko
k
k:
kT
kt
L
LA
LE
LS
LT
M
m
N
NT
NV
ND
n(k),
P
P(k)
PD
RE
PrA
Pi
n(k)
acceleration due to gravity, ft/sec 2
system output, or observation, matrix
hypothesis that the ith component has failed
hypothesis that a failure has occurred
hypothesis that no failure has occurred
product of inertia in zx-plane, ft-lb-sec 2
moment of inertia about _-axis, ft-lb-sec 2
multiplicative factor used in computing threshold
sample number
sample number (time) when failure occurs
sample number at which trigger test passes and initiates the verify
test
sample number at which value of equivalent statistic equals or
exceeds threshold
aerodynamic and propulsive moment about x-axis, ft-lb
left aileron
left elevator
left stabilizer
left thrust
_-axis coordinate of sensor relative to center of gravity, ft
aerodynamic and propulsive moment about y-axis, ft-lb
mass of aircraft, slugs
aerodynamic and propulsive moment about z-axis, ft-lb, or num-
ber of samples
maximum number of samples in isolate test
number of samples in trigger test
maximum number of samples in verify test
failure not detected
Gaussian noise sequence
total roll rate, rad/sec or deg/sec
covariance matrix of state in error model
probability of detection
probability of error
probability of false alarm
trigger, verify projection vector for ith failure
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Pi/j
PM
p, q, r
Pm
Q
Q
Qo
qm
R
RA
RE
RS
RT
Ru
rm
S
S(N), S(N)
SI
S_/¢ (k - kT + 1)
ST
SV
s_(k - kT+ 1),
S_(k - kT+ 1)
S_(k)
N, 8
TURB
TURBL, TURBM,
TURBH
tL
isolation projection vector for ith failure more likely than jth
failure
probability of missed detection
body-axis attitude rates, rad/sec or deg/sec
measured perturbed roll rate, rad/sec
covariance matrix of noise input to the error model
total pitch rate, rad/sec or deg/sec
pitch rate at trim, rad/sec
dynamic pressure, lb/ft 2
measured perturbed pitch rate, rad/sec
total yaw rate, rad/sec or deg/sec
right aileron
right elevator
right stabilizer
right thrust
rudder
measured perturbed yaw rate, rad/sec
reference wing area, ft 2
sum of N residuals
isolation-test statistic
test statistic in aircraft-path isolation test
trigger-test statistic in aircraft path
trigger-test statistic in actuator path
verify-test statistic
sum of "_i(m), yj(m) from m = k T to m = k
equivalent statistic
failure signal
value of failure signal s that is reliable according to d 2 metric, deg
or lb x 103
specified or estimated value of standard deviation of turbulence,
used as independent variable in interpolation, ft/sec
low, medium, and high break
points of independent variable in linear interpolation
lower threshold in sequential probability ratio test
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tT
tu
tv
t_z
U
u()
Uo
V
V
fZ(k)
Vcas
vm(k)
vP(k)
VT
VT_
%
W
w(k)
Wd(k)
 e(k)
wo
X
x, y, z
x(k)
xh(k)
 ht(k)
 :si(k)
Y
YL, YM, YH
y(k)
Ym
Z
trigger threshold
upper threshold in sequential probability ratio test
verify threshold
threshold for ith failure test
speed in x-direction, ft/sec
undetermined failure of one of the surfaces listed in parentheses
x-velocity at trim, ft/sec
vector sequence of control inputs
inertial velocity, ft/sec
speed in y-direction, ft/sec
estimated velocity, ft/sec
calibrated airspeed, knots
measured velocity relative to air mass, ft/sec
predicted velocity, ft/sec
true airspeed, ft/sec
measured true airspeed, ft/sec
true airspeed at trim, ft/sec
speed in z-direction, ft/sec
noise input in state-space model
noise input to high-pass filter in error model
white Gaussian noise input to low-frequency error model
z-velocity at trim, ft/sec
total aerodynamic and propulsive force in x-direction, lb
aircraft body axes
state vector
output of high-pass-filtered error model
output of low-pass filter in high-pass-filtered error model
state variable in model of error in S(N)
total aerodynamic and propulsive force in y-direction, lb
low, medium, and high break points of dependent variable in
linear interpolation
vector sequence of outputs, or observations
sensor measurement
total aerodynamic and propulsive force in z-direction, lb
c_ m
c_0
fl
tim
A
At
5
5a
5c
6m
¢(k)
0
0
A(k)
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v(k),
Et
Ew
gr
a2
_rG
4
angle of attack, deg
measured total angle of attack, rad or deg
measured perturbed angle of attack after compensation for atti-
tude rate effects, rad or deg
angle of attack at trim, tad or deg
sideslip angle, deg
measured total sideslip angle, rad or deg
measured perturbed sideslip angle after compensation for attitude
rate effects, rad or deg
sideslip angle at trim, rad or deg
residual sequence after projection and filtering
total deflection, deg or lb x 103
sample interval, sec
deflection relative to trim value, deg or lb x 10 3
true actuator position
commanded actuator position
measured actuator position
measured perturbed deflection of ith control surface, deg
measurement error sequence, ft/sec
sequence of residuals in turbulence estimator
total pitch angle, deg
total pitch angle, rad or deg
log likelihood ratio
residual
sequence of residuals
force or moment residual, ft/sec 2 or rad/sec
covariance matrix of S(N)
covariance matrix of low-frequency error sequence ni(k)
covariance matrix of white-noise sequence nw (k)
standard deviation, ft/sec
variance
variance of S(N)
specified standard deviation of simulated turbulence, ft/sec
variance of scalar low-frequency error sequence nt,(k )
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aS1i/j
aT
au
aV
o W
IM
03 a
Subscripts:
d
E
h
I
i
J
LA
LE
LH
LS
LT
1
m
n
RA
RE
RH
RS
variance of S(k)
variance of Sii/j(k - k T + 1)
sample standard deviation of simulated turbulence, ft/sec
sample standard deviation of x-component of simulated
turbulence, ft/sec
sample standard deviation of y-component of simulated
turbulence, ft/sec
sample standard deviation of z-component of simulated
turbulence, ft/sec
variance of scalar white-noise sequence nw(k)
total bank angle, rad or deg
total heading angle, rad or deg
attitude rate, rad/sec
actuator-model cutoff frequency, rad/sec
component of design model
elevator
after high-pass filtering
isolate test
ith component
jth component
left aileron
left elevator
left horizontal tail
left stabilizer
left thrust
moment about x-axis
low-frequency component of error (noise), or moment about x-axis
measured quantity, or moment about y-axis
moment about z-axis
right aileron
right elevator
right horizontal tail
right stabilizer
RT
Ru
Sp
T
Th
T1
t
V
w
X,Y,Z
X_ y_ Z
6A
6E
6R
5S
6T
P
Superscripts:
c
P
T
Operators:
E{}
var ( )
Abbreviations:
BL
FDI
HPF
LPF
PV10
right thrust
rudder
spoiler
trigger test
thrust
throttle
component of truth model
verify test
white noise
force along x-, y-, or z-axis
along or about x-, y-, or z-body axis
aileron deflection about nominal (trim)
elevator deflection about nominal (trim)
rudder deflection about nominal (trim)
stabilizer deflection about nominal (trim)
spoiler deflection about nominal (trim)
thrust perturbation about nominal (trim)
x-, y-, or z-channel in turbulence estimator
after compensation
predicted value
transpose of a matrix
denotes averaged over two successive samples
statistical expected value
estimate
statistical variance
baseline
failure detection and
identification
high-pass filter
low-pass filter
projection vector at lO-ft/sec turbulence
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PV20
RFCS
SPRT
TG
projectionvectorat 20-ft/secturbulence
restructurableflight controlsystem
sequentialprobabilityratio test
threshold
Baseline Design
DesignConcept
Failuredetectionand isolationis the processof detectingabnormal,or out-of-tolerance,
behaviorin a systemandisolatingthesourceof theabnormalityto a subsystemor component.
Onemethodof accomplishingthis is to examinethe systemoutputs,or perhapsthe subsystem
outputs. For example,the poweroutput of an RF (radio frequency)transmitter couldbe
measured,andif thepowerwereoutsideoflimits establishedbyprevioustesting,thetransmitter
couldbedeclaredfailed.In this way,detectionandisolationto the transmittersubsystemlevel
areperformedin a singleoperation. Of course,this procedureis reliableonly if the power
measurementis morereliablethan thetransmitter. A commontechniquefor detectingfailures
in redundantsensors,wherethreeor moresensorsmeasurethesamequantity,is avotingscheme
wherebythe outputsof the sensorsarecomparedwith eachother. If oneof the outputsdiffers
from theothersby morethannormaltolerance,that sensoris consideredfailed.
TheFDI systemfor aircraft controlelementsposesa slightlydifferentproblem.Unlikethe
transmitter, the output (position)of the actuatorsusedto movethe controlsurfacescannot
be comparedwith a constant,becausethe output dependson the input. On the otherhand,
the actuatorsarenot triply replicated,sotheir outputscannotbe comparedwith eachother.
Moreover,theeffectiveoutputsof thecontrolsurfacesarethe aerodynamicforcesandmoments
that areexertedon the aircraft, andtheseforcesandmomentsarenot measureddirectly. In
thesecases,someform of analyticredundancymustbeusedto form aset of normalpredicted
measurementswith whicha similar set of actual measurementscan be compared. Several
suchtechniquesutilize a centralfilter, whichusesa modelof the aircraft dynamicsto predict
aircraftperformance,comparesthis predictionto measuredperformance,andgeneratesasetof
residualswhosebehavioris usedto detectandisolatefailures.Someof thesemethods,suchas
thegeneralizedlikelihoodratio, failure-detectionfilter, andabankof Kalmanfilters,havebeen
investigatedfor applicationto theFDI problemin aircraftcontrolsystems.(Seerefs.9 to 12,15
to 18,and22.) Oneofthemajorproblemswith thesetechniquesis that errorsin themodelsused
bythecentralfilter produceabnormalitiesin theresiduals,whicharedifficult to distinguishfrom
a systemfailure. Thus,oneof themajorthrustsofthe investigationdiscussedin thisreportwas
to developanFDI systemthat wasrobustto modelerrors.Weissandhiscolleaguesconceived
sucha system,whichthey call decentralizedFDI, developeda designmethodology,andused
this methodologyto designa decentralizedFDI systemfor the 737aircraft. The remainder
of this sectionpresentsa reviewof, andin a fewcasesanexpansionof, the methodologyand
designfromtheir report.
Subsystems
A major step in the direction of robustness was the division of the FDI system into separate
subsystems: the actuator-path subsystem and the aircraft-path subsystem. The actuator-path
subsystem was designed to detect and isolate failures that occur between the measurement
of actuator input (control system command to the actuator) and the measurement of actuator
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output position. (See fig. 1.) The aircraft-path subsystem was designed to detect control-element
failures that occur outboard of the actuator position measurement. Such failures include broken
linkages or hinges and control surfaces that are damaged or partially missing.
Actuator
t °utputs 1 Aircraft ' _ Aircraft
Actuat°r 1 _1 Actuators 1 _-- dynamics] 1
commands v I r states
s o rsI I I Seo or"r
6c lim Ym
Actuator Aircraft
path path
Figure 1. Definition of failure paths.
The actuator-path subsystem consists of a separate FDI element for each actuator. As
shown in figure 2, each element operates as follows: The system contains a model of the
actuator dynamics, where the complexity of the model depends on the complexity of the
actuator dynamics and on the desired sensitivity of the FDI system. The actuator command is
input to the model, and a predicted actuator response (output position) is computed. This
predicted output is then compared with the measured output of the real actuator, and a
residual is generated. During normal operation, this residual would be near zero, since the
predicted output would agree with the measured output with an accuracy that depended on the
accuracy of the model and the error in the measurement. This residual is then processed by a
decision algorithm to detect a failure. Since there is a separate FDI element for each actuator,
failure detection also serves as failure isolation, and multiple actuator-path failures are easily
accommodated. With this technique, robustness is served because the model is that of the
actuator, whose dynamics should be better known than those of the entire aircraft, and because
the measurements used should be less noisy than some aircraft performance measurements, such
as angular accelerations.
l
Command _iiActuatorActuat°r]mOdel] Predicted+_._ process decisions
Figure 2. Typical element of actuator-path subsystem.
The design of the aircraft-path subsystem assumes that hinge-moment measurements for
each of the control surfaces are not available. Therefore, as shown in figure 3, this subsystem
must utilize measurements of the aircraft dynamic response to commanded maneuvers to detect
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and isolate failures. A linear model of the aerodynamics at the selected operating point, or
flight condition, is used to predict the forces and moments acting on the aircraft based on
the aircraft state and the measured surface positions. The nonlinear equations of motion and
sensor models are then used to predict angular and linear acceleration measurements in body
coordinates. These predictions are compared with the measured quantities to form residuals
that are processed in a decision algorithm to detect and isolate aircraft-path failures. The
current design does not accommodate multiple aircraft-path failures.
Command L[ Aircraft _ Sensors
,T
Aircraft ___ Sensormodel models I Predicted
Decision _ FDIprocess decisions
Figure 3. Aircraft-path subsystem.
Decision Process
The general pattern is to make measurements of the response of the system, either the aircraft
or an actuator, to compare that measurement with a calculated measurement that was produced
by using a model of the system, and to use the residuals that result from this comparison in a
decision mechanism. To achieve the desired missed-detection/false-Marm performance in a noisy
environment, while providing quick response to a failure when the failure time is unknown, the
decision process is structured as a set of trigger-verify-isolate tests as shown in figure 4. All
three of the tests are designed as statistical hypotheses tests.
Residuals m
__ Possible
Trigger failure
tests
o Limit missed detections
o Fast response
__ Verifytests
o Low false alarm
o Minimum time
Isolatetests
r
o Minimum time
Pairwise I
decisions Decision
logic
Detection
•_ decision
Isolation
decision
Figure 4. Structure of decision process.
The trigger, verify, and isolate tests each use the vector of residuals as an input. The problem
is to determine whether or not the residuals are "normal," that is, whether the residuals result
from an unfailed system or from a failed system. The structure of these tests is determined by
using a simplified design model for the residuals; this model assumes that the vector sequence
of residuals is composed of two parts: (1) a slowly varying signal vector that can be considered
constant for the duration of the test and is present only during a failure, and (2) a white Gaussian
noise vector that results from sensor noise and quantization noise. Once the test structure is
chosen, the parameters of the test are selected by using a more complete truth model for the
residuals, a model that includes other sources of error, such as biases and system model errors.
This procedure, which uses a design model to determine the algorithm structure and a truth
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model to determine values for the algorithm parameters, is intended to increase the robustness
of the design.
Single Operating Point
The FDI system discussed in this report utilized a linear model of the aircraft aerodynamics
in the system design; that is, the aerodynamic forces and moments acting on the aircraft
were assumed to be linear functions of the aircraft states and of the control deflections. This
assumption is valid only over a limited portion of the aircraft operating envelope. Therefore,
the FDI system design presented herein is single-point design. In this case, the operating point
for the modified 737 is described in table 1.
Table 1. Aircraft Operating Point for FDI System Design
[Landing gear up]
Altitude, ft ............................... 3500
Indicated airspeed, knots .......................... 160
Flight-path angle, deg ............................ 0
Flap angle, deg .............................. 15
Design Methodology
Actuator-Path Subsystem
Residual generation. In the actuator-path subsystem, a sequence of residuals v(k) is
generated by comparing the measured output position of the actual actuator with the position
that was computed by using a nonlinear model of the actuator as shown in figure 5. In general,
the actuator model includes a single-pole linear transfer function, a rate limiter, a position
limiter, and a cable stretch factor. The model input is the actuator position command generated
by the flight control system. The model output (computed actuator position) is compared with
a measurement of the actual position, and the measurement includes a bias and additive white
Gaussian noise and is assumed to occur somewhere between the actuator rod and the surface
hinge, inclusively. The model is single-input/single-output, such that the residual vector is one
dimensional, or a scalar sequence. In a flight system, errors would be introduced into the model
output, and thus into the residuals, by such things as unmodeled high-frequency dynamics,
hysteresis effects, and variations from one set of hardware to another.
[ [ Sensor 5 + _
_._ Actuator ! 5a _[ m
C
l v I
V
to" Rate H Positio"j to + toa limiter limiter factor
Figure 5. Actuator-path residual generation.
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The model for the engines is more complex. Commanded thrust is the input, and engine
pressure ratio (EPR) is the actual measurement. The EPR is converted to "measured" thrust
by using a transformation that is a function of altitude. The rate limit is a function of the
current thrust and is different for engine spool-up and spool-down.
Design model. The residuals generated as in the preceding section are assumed to be
composed of a zero-mean, white Gaussian random component, which accounts for sensor noise
and quantization error, and a low-frequency error component. When a failure has occurred,
there is a time-varying component that results from the failure; this component is the signal
that must be detected to indicate a failure. For design purposes, it is assumed that this time
variation is slow compared with the detection time of 0.5 to 2 sec. Therefore, to determine the
structure of the decision tests, the signal s is assumed constant, and the low-frequency error
term is ignored. The design model of the residual ud(k ) is then
HI: vd(k ) = s + nw(k)
]H0: vd(k ) = nw(k) (1)
where s is the failure signal and nw(k) is white Gaussian noise. The conditional probability
density function for vd(k ) is
HI: p (vd(k)[H1) --
H0:p (-e(k)lH0)- }
exp [- (Pd - 8) 2
ff2rCa2w
1 [_v_/2a2w]exp
(2)
where a2w is the variance of nw(k).
Truth model. The truth model for the residuals used in determining the parameters of
the tests includes a low-frequency noise term ngH(k ) to account for sensor biases and other
model errors. As noted previously, the decision process assumes that the random component
of the residual is white. Therefore, a high-pass whitening prefilter is used between the residual
generator and the decision algorithm to decorrelate the residual noise. The filter cutoff frequency
is chosen to be less than the inverse of the detection time to preserve the coherence of the signal.
The truth model for the residuals then becomes
HI: vt(k) = Sh + ngh(k) + nwh(k) I
]H0: vt(k) = ngh(k ) + nwh(k) (3)
where the subscript h denotes the quantity after high-pass filtering, and a 2 is the variance of
the low-frequency noise ng(k) before high-pass filtering.
To improve detection performance, the decision process utilizes a signal S(N) that is the
sum of the residuals over N samples; that is,
N
S(N) = F_, .t(k)
k=l
(4)
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Thevariancea_ of S(N)can be approximated as a_ = N2a_ + Na 2. To determine the variance
a) more accurately, first express the random portion of the process _,t(k) as the output of a
linear system. Let the linear system be expressed in state-space form as follows:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bw(k) /
/y(k) = H x(k) (5)
With reference to figure 6, the low-pass noise nf(k) can be expressed as the output of a low-pass
filter driven by zero-mean, white Gaussian noise wi(k ) as follows:
ne(k + 1) = aene(k) + (1 - ag)wg(k) (6)
n
w
wt
I
Low-passfilter _Xh_t i=l
Figure 6. Truth model of residual noise process.
Let Wd(k ) be the sum of ng(k) and nw(k). The high-pass-filtered noise Xh(k ) can be modeled as
the difference between noise wd(k ) and the output Xhg(k ) of a low-pass filter driven by wd(k);
that is
and
Wd(k ) = ng(k) + nw(k)
xhe(k + 1) = ahgXhg(k ) + (1 - ahg ) wd(k )
Combining equations (7) and (8) gives
xM(k + 1) = ahexhe(k ) + (1 - ahe)ne(k ) + (1 - ahg)nw(k )
and
Xh(k ) = wd(k ) - Xhg(k )
(r)
(8)
(9)
(10)
The output xh(k ) of the high-pass filter is the input to the summation function, which sums
the input over N samples as follows:
k
n(k) = E xh(i) (11)
i=k-N+l
The summation function can be modeled as an N-state linear system, where each state xsi(k )
only provides a one-sample delay and the output matrix provides the summation.
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Wenowcombineequations(6) to (11)into thestate-spacesystemdescribedby equations(5).
The resultingsystemis describedby thefollowingsystemof equations:
x(k) =
_l(k)
z2(k)
_3(k)
_4(k)
XN+2(k)
he(k)
xhe(k)
XSl(k)
= z&(k)
_SN(k)
(12)
h
w(k)=
a_
(1 - aht )
1
S __
Wl(k)
 2 k)l = [ _e(k) ]
0
ahg
-1
0
0
0
0
(1 - ahg )
1
0
0 0 -.. 0
0 0 .-. 0
0 0 ... 0
1 0 .-- 0
0 1 ... 0
0 0 ..- 1
(1 - at)
0
0
0
0
_
0
0
0
0
0
(13)
(14)
(15)
H=[0 0 1 1 ..- 1] (16)
where
A=N+2×N+2, B=N+2x2, andH=lxN+2
The system output y(k) is the noise sequence n(k) in the truth model after summing over N
samples; that is
n(k) = y(k) (17)
The covariance matrix P(k) of the system state x(k) can be found by solving the Lyapunov
equation as follows:
E{x(k + 1)xT(k + 1)} =AE{x(k)xT(k)}A T + AE{x(k)wT(k)}B T
+ BE{w(k)xT(k)}A T + BE{w(k)wT(k)}B T
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or
P(k + 1) = AP(k)A T + BQB T
where
0
In the steady state as k approaches infinity, equation (18) becomes
(18)
(19)
P = APAT + BQB T (20)
The solutionforthe variancecr}ofthe noisen(k) inthe truthmodel can then be found from
a} = HPH T
This value is then used in the statistical hypotheses tests.
(21)
Trigger test. To detect the potential presence of a failure that, according to the design model,
results in a constant of unknown magnitude and sign in white Gaussian noise, the trigger test
is designed to perform a Bayesian hypothesis test on a fixed sample length of residuals. This
is accomplished by computing the log likelihood ratio AT(k ) of the most recent N T residuals,
taking the absolute value of AT(k), and comparing the result to a threshold. A window of
N T residuals is used rather than a single sample to increase the signal-to-noise ratio, and the
window of fixed sample length is updated every iteration to account for the unknown onset time
of the failure.
Since the v(k)'s are independent according to the design model, the log likelihood ratio based
on the probability density function in equations (2) is given by
f p[v(k- N T + 1), u(k- N T + 2), .-., _(k)]H1] }AT(k)=ln[p[v(k-NT+l), v( T+2), , v( )l 0]
k s.(i) s2
E 4 24
i=k-NT+l
(22)
where p [v(k - N T + 1), z_(k - N T + 2), --., v(k)lHi] is the joint conditional probability den-
sity function of the most recent N T residuals (given Hi). Instead of using AT(k), the trigger
test utilizes an equivalent statistic ST(k ) given by
k
ST(k) = (1/NT) E v(i) (23)
i=k-NT+l
Since the u(k)'s are independent, ST(k ) is Gaussian with variance a}T = a2w/NT and mean
zero under H 0 and mean s under H 1. The trigger test becomes
]ST(k)l { >_ iT, then H I
< tT, then H 0
(24)
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To determinethe thresholdtT, first consider the design model for the residuals. The
probability of false alarm (choosing the hypothesis H I when H 0 is true) is given by the integral
PFA = 2 P(STIHo) dS T
(25)
The threshold t T is chosen to achieve the desired false-alarm rate; that is
t T = KaaST (26)
For example, a PFA of 1 × 10-3 results in Ka = 3.3, or t T = 3.3aST.
Now that the structure of the trigger test has been chosen, the whitening prefilter is inserted,
and equations (55 to (21) are used to compute the variance a_w of the test statistic ST(k ) using
the truth model. The truth-model variance is then used in equation (265 to determine the
threshold t T. The resulting trigger test is shown in figure 7.
/
(k) _ High-pass
I filter
Figure 7. Actuator-path trigger test.
Trigger
Verify test. The output of the trigger test is used to initiate the verify test, which is structured
as a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) as shown in figure 8. It has been shown (ref. 355
that, on the average, the SPRT decides between two hypotheses in a shorter time than a fixed-
length test. If, in the design model (eqs. (1)), the signal s is a known constant, then at each
sample time k after initiation of the test, the standard SPRT computes the likelihood ratio
Av(k ) as in equation (22). The likelihood ratio is then compared with two thresholds. If the
ratio exceeds the upper threshold, hypothesis H 1 is accepted, and if the ratio is less than the
lower threshold, hypothesis H 0 is accepted (or H 1 rejected). If the ratio is between the two
thresholds, another sample is taken and the test is repeated. Mathematically, this procedure is
expressed as follows:
p[t,(kT) , t/(k T + 1), ..., v(k)lH1]Av(k) -=-p[v(kT) , t_(k T + 15, ..-, v(k)IH0]
=exp 4
i=kT
(27)
If Av(k ) > tu, then decide H 1
If t L < Av(k 5 < tu, then take another sample
If Av(k ) < tL, then decide H 0
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Verify
Figure 8. Actuator-path verify test.
It has been shown (ref. 35) that if PM and PFA are the desired missed-detection and false-alarm
probabilities, then the thresholds should be set to
1- Phi
tu-- PFA (28)
and
PM
tL -- 1 - PFA (29)
If the desired missed-detection and false-alarm probabilities are equal, then the test is symmet-
rical, and the thresholds become
tu = --tn = tv (30)
Instead of the likelihood ratio Av(k), the sufficient statistic Sv(k ) can be used, where (for
notational simplicity k is redefined to begin when the trigger test passes)
k
8
i=1
(31)
If Sv(k ) >_ tv,
If -t V < SV(k ) < tV,
then decide H 1
then take another sample
If Sv(k ) < -tv, then decide H 0
From equations (27) and (31),
tv = (a2w/S) ln(t U) (32)
As a preface to designing the verify test with the truth model, a few characteristics of the
design-model verify test should be discussed. First, the conditional expected values of the test
statistic Sv(k ) are
k8
E {Sv(k)[H1} = _- (33)
and
k8
E {Sv(k)IHo) - 2 (34)
Also, the variance of the test statistic, independent of the hypothesis, is given by
= (35)
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Considera measured2 of the ability of a signal y to distinguish between two hypotheses H 0
and H1, where the d 2 metric is defined by (ref. 25)
d2 = (E {y[H1} - E {Y[H0}) 2 (36)
var (y)
The d 2 metric is then a measure of the distance between the means of the signal under the two
hypotheses normalized by the standard deviation of the signal. For the test statistic Sv(k), d 2
can be determined by using equations (33) to (36) as follows:
ks2 (37)
 2(k) =
Furthermore, at sample k t when the expected value of the test signal equals the threshold, that
is, when
E {Sv(kt)Igl} = t v (38)
then d2(kt) is given by
2stv (1-PM)a2(kt) = = 2 In F --AA (39)
These relationships will be used subsequently.
Thus far we have structured the verify test as an SPRT and have seen how the parameters
can be chosen for the design model, that is, for the case of a constant in white Gaussian noise.
Selecting the parameter values for the truth model is more difficult than for the trigger test.
First of all, provisions must be made to assure that the test does not continue indefinitely
without making a decision. Thus, if the test has not made a decision after N V samples, the test
will be terminated and a false trigger will be declared.
Following the procedure developed by Weiss (ref. 25), the gains G A and G D and the threshold
t V will be selected. The procedure is as follows:
1. Determine what value $ of the failure signal s will produce a verify test at sample N V
that is reliable according to the d2 metric; that is, solve the following equation for _:
= (2Ko)2 (40)
d2 (Nv) -- a2Sy (Nv)
where 2Ka is the desired normalized distance between the means of Sv(Nv) for reliable
detection, and a2v(NV) is the variance of Sv(Nv) , which is calculated as presented
previously by using the model for Sv(Nv) and solving the appropriate Lyapunov
equation.
2. From figure 8, let
GA=I}__ (41)
aD = 2
3. Determine the value k t of k for which the d 2 metric equals or exceeds 2 In [(1 - PE)/PE];
that is, from equations (36) and (39) solve the following for kt:
k2_ 2
> 21n(1-PE_ (42)
d2 (SV (kt)) - a_vS (kt) - \ /PE
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4. SetthethresholdtV equal to the mean value of S(k) at k = kt as follows:
t V --- E {Sv(kt)IH1} (43)
This completes the design of the verify test with one exception. Since the sign of the failure
signal s is unknown, take the absolute value of the sum of the residuals to form S V (k). The
resulting configuration of the verify test is shown in figure 8.
Aircraft-Path Subsystem
Residual generation. The design of the aircraft-path subsystem must detect failures that
occur outboard of the measurements of the actuator positions, failures such as a partially
missing surface. When a failure of this type occurs, the response of the aircraft is different
from the response that would normally be produced by the commands or controls. If this
response is measured, and if a model could be used to predict the normal (unfailed) response to
the commands in effect, then perhaps these responses could be compared to detect and isolate
the failure. Thus, the first element in the aircraft-path subsystem is a residual generator, which
utilizes measurements related to the aircraft state, measurements of the actuator positions, a
linear model of the aircraft aerodynamics, and the nonlinear equations of motion in the residual-
generation process.
To understand this residual-generation process in more detail, assume a rigid-body aircraft
that is symmetrical with respect to the xz-plane, and neglect the rotation of the Earth. The
equations of motion in body axes are (ref. 36)
X - mgsinO = m ((] + QW - RV) ]
Y + mgcosOsin _b = m ((/" + RU- PVV) Iz +_cos0cos,_=m(w+Pv-qu)
M=_Q- rzx(_ - P_)-(r_- J_)RPJN=_zR-_z_(P-QR)-(r_ - _)PQ
(44)
Uppercase symbols have been used to denote total quantities rather than perturbed quantities.
Consider the first three equations of equations (44), which describe the translational dynamics
of the aircraft. These can be arranged in units of linear acceleration as follows:
X/m = (] + QW - RV + g sin 0 ]
Y/m = V + RU - PW - g cos 0 sin (I)
Z/m = I/V + PV - QU - g cos 0 cos (I)
(45)
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The quantitieson the right sideof equations(45)are the specificforcesthat aremeasured
by the body-mountedaccelerometers;that is, the accelerometermeasurementsat the centerof
A C
mx
A c
my
A c
mz
gravity are
= {_]+ QW- RV +gsinO+ ex I
I= (7 + RU - PW - g cos 0 sin (I, + ey
= IiV + PV - QU - g cos 0 cos • + ez
(46)
where e i is the measurement error.
If a model of the aircraft aerodynamics could be used to compute predicted values for the
forces X, Y, and Z as functions of the aircraft state and the control-surface positions, we
could compare these predictions with the acceleromete:_ measurements to form residuals. These
residuals would normally (no failures) be zero except for noise and model errors. To compute
these predicted values, consider that estimates X, Y, and Z of the forces can be expressed as
functions of the nondimensional coefficients as follows:
)y = _SC v
Z = _/SCz
(47)
where _/ is the dynamic pressure and S is the reference wing area. In the vicinity of a single-
aircraft operating point, such as the one given in table 1, the coefficients can be approximated
as a truncated Taylor series that retains only the first derivatives as follows:
ac
O_= C_o+ c_o m+ 2--_roCx_q_+ _ C%_m_
i
b
Cy:_Yo +CY_?_t_ + 2-_T 0 (CypPm +Cyrrm ) + _-_CY6i_m ii
(48)
ac
ez = Czo+ c_o m+ T_oroCzdm+ _ c_,_m,
i
In equations (48) the air-data variables a c and t3c, the body-axis angular rates Pro, qm, and
rm, and the surface deflections 6mi are perturbed quantities relative to the operating point,
or trim values. Effects of the trim values are contained in the constants Cxo, Cyo, and Czo.
Predicted, or estimated, values of the forces can now be computed by using equations (47)
and (48), and the following residuals can be formed for the linear accelerations:
Vx = ACmx - f(/m ]
Vy A c Y/m
my
Uz = A c Z/rn
mz
(49)
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The last threeequationsof equations(44) canbe rearrangedas follows,neglectingcross
productsof inertia:
P
Q=
/¢
1 L Iy-Iz
Ix + _ QR
1 M Iz-Ix RP
_y + iy
1 y Ix-Iy
iz+T_ PQ
(50)
For the purpose of forming residuals, predicted values of the right-hand sides of equations (50)
can be obtained by using measured quantities for the angular rates P, Q, and R and by using
estimates of the moments L, M, and N as with the previous forces. In particular, let the
moments be expressed as
A
M = _S_Crn (51)
=
Now approximate the coefficients Ci as the linear terms of a Taylor series expansion as follows:
b (CgpPrn + Cgrrm ) 4- E Cf$iSrniee=Ceo+ +
Cm Cmo + Crna c
= c_m + 2--V_ToCmqqm +
E Cm$i 5mi
i
b
i
(52)
As in equations (48), the air-data variables, the body-axis angular rates, and the surface
deflections are perturbed values relative to the operating point. Equations (50), (51), and
(52) can now be combined to obtain predicted values for the angular accelerations as follows:
A
p= 1 ^ Iy - IzQmRm
_x L+ Ix
1._. Iz-Ix
-_y M -l- -- -[-y-- Rm Pm
1_ Ix-Iy
-_z + E Praqm
(53)
These predicted quantities could now be compared with the measured values/bin, Qrn, and Rm
of the angular accelerations if they were available; however, angular accelerations normally are
not measured. Therefore, residuals are formed by comparing the predicted change in angular
rate in one sample period with the change obtained from differencing successive measurements
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of angularrate. Let
a_(k) = At _(k2 [_(k)+ - 1)]
2
a_(k) = A2 _(k 1
Also, let
ARm(k) = Pro(k)- rm(k- 1) /
AVm(k) = Qm(k) - Qm(k - 1)
ARm(k) = Rm(k) - Rm(k - 1)
The residuals can now be formed as follows:
(54)
(55)
up(k) = ARm(k)- AP(k) ]
vo(k) = AQm(k) - AQ,(k) l
!
vR(k ) ARm(k) A[t(k),
(56)
In equations (48), (52), (53), and (55), measured vaIues of the attitude rates are used.
Although perturbed values of these rates are used in equations (48) and (52), these will usually
be the same as the total values, since the attitude rates are normally zero at trim. The angles
of attack and sideslip in equations (48) and (52) are perturbed, measured quantities that have
compensated for lever-arm effects if the _ and fl sensors are not at the center of gravity; that
is,
o_c = O_m + fx (Qm/Vrm) - fy (Pm/VTm) - ozo _ (57)
flCm = tim - _,x (Rm/VTm) + gz (Pm/VTm) - flO J
Also, the accelerations in equations (46) and (49) are measured quantities that include
compensation for a location other than the center of gravity; that is,
A C
mx
AC
A c
mz
=Amy-[fx(PmQmq-Rm)-fy(p2+R2m)q_z(RmQm-/bm)j (58)
The residuals from equations (49) and (56) form a six-dimensional vector sequence of residuals
_(k) =
v(k) as follows:
M(k) _x(k) 1
_2(k) .y(k)
_3(k) _z(k)
v4(k ) up(k)
_(k) vQ(k)
.u6(k). .vn(k)J
(59)
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Toseewhathappensto theresidualv(k) in theeventof afailure,considerthefirst component
ux(k) when a portion of the jth control surface is lost at time k = kf. From equations (47),
(48), and (49)
ux (k ) = A emx - --reX= A Cmx q--SmC x
= ACmx OSm Cxo + CxoaC(k) + 2--V_ToCxqqm(k) + Z Cx_i6mi(k)
i
(60)
As shown by Weiss (ref. 25), the aerodynamic coefficients can be expressed in terms of elements
of the A and B matrices. Equation (60) can then be written as
ux(k) = A c qScxo - [-AllW0 + (Qo + A12) U0] aCn(k)
mx m
- (Wo + A13) qm(k) - Z Bli6mi (k)
i
(61)
If there were no noise, no model errors, and no failures, then ux(k) would be zero. Suppose that
at k = k f, a portion of control surface j is lost, such that a fraction e of its effectiveness is lost.
Then the residual is described by .
ux(k) = Blje6mj(k ) (k >__k f) (62)
Similar results hold for the other components of the residual vector, so that u(k) can be expressed
as
_(k) = BjeSmj = Bjfs = s (k >_ k f) (63)
where Bj is the jth column of the B matrix, and fs is the effective failure magnitude.
Design model. In a realistic system, there is sensor noise and quantization noise, and there
are errors due to modeling inaccuracies; these add a random component n(k) to the residual
sequence _,(k). When a failure of the ith surface has occurred, a time-varying component
Bifs(k ) results from the failure; this component is the signal that must be detected to detect
a failure. As in the actuator-path subsystem, it is assumed for design purposes that this time
variation is slow compared with the detection time of 0.5 to 2 sec. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the random component is a zero-mean, white Gaussian vector sequence with uncorrelated
components. The design model u(k) of the residual is then
Hi: vd(k) = + nw(k) ]
fH0: vd(k) = nw(k) (64)
where s i is the failure signal and nw(k) is white Gaussian noise. The conditional probability
density functions for ud(k ) are
Hi: P(Vd(k)lHi)=
H0: P(vd(k)lH O) = 1 exp{ l[vd(k)_si]TNwl[vd(k)_si]}l
(2r) 3 [det 1/2
1 exp{ ls.,T(k) wlvd(k)}
(65)
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wherethe covariancematrix _Ewof nw(k) is diagonal. The decisionprocessis structured
accordingto this designmodel.
Truth model. As in the case of the actuator-path subsystem, the truth model for the residuals
used in determining the parameters of the decision process includes a low-frequency noise
term ngh(k ) to account for sensor biases and other model errors. As noted previously, the
decision process assumes that the random component of the residual is white. Therefore, a
high-pass whitening prefilter is used between the residual generator and the decision algorithm
to decorrelate the residual noise. The filter cutoff frequency is chosen to be less than the inverse
of the detection time to preserve the coherence of the signal. The truth model for the residuals
then becomes
Hi: vt(k) = Sih + nth(k) + nwh(k) _ (66)
H0: vt(k) = neh(k ) + nwh(k) )
where the subscript h denotes the quantity after high-pass filtering and ]El is the variance of
the low-frequency noise ng(k) before high-pass filtering; ]E_ is assumed to be diagonal.
To improve detection performance, the decision process again utilizes a signal S(N) that is
the sum of the residuals over N samples; that is,
N
S(N) = Z vt(k)
k=l
(67)
The covariance _Ef of S(N) can be approximated as _f = N2]Eg + NZw. Since ]Ef is diagonal,
2 of _Ef can be determined separately. Express each component of the noiseeach element aii
vector n(k) = nih(k ) +nwh(k ) in state space as the output of a linear system, as was done with
the scalar noise n(k) in the actuator path, and then solve the Lyapunov equation.
Trigger tests. Based on the design model, the trigger test for the ith surface must decide
whether a constant vector signal s i is present (hypothesis Hi) or not (hypothesis H0), where
the signal is corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise. The resulting trigger test for the ith
failure in the aircraft path, as with the actuator path, is based on computing the log likelihood
ratio ATi (k) of a window of the most recent N T residuals. That ratio is
k lsTEwlsiATi(k)= 2_ (s/TlEwlv(j) - 2 ) (68)
j=k-NT+I
An equivalent statistic is
k
STi(k ) = 2_ pTv(j) (69)
j=k-NT+I
where the projection vector Pi is used to produce a scalar metric for the test, and the residuals
are computed as in equations (49), (56), and (59). Since the v(k)'s are independent, STi(k) is
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Gaussianwith conditionalmeansandvarianceasfollows:
var(STi(k)[Hi) = var(STi(k)]Ho) = a 2 = NTPT IEwP i
(70)
The trigger test becomes
>_ tTi , then H 1STi(k) < tTi , then 0 (71)
where the threshold tTi is determined as in the actuator-path subsystem. First, for the design
model, the probability of false alarm is given by equation (25). In equation (26), Ka is chosen
to achieve the desired false-alarm rate. The number of samples N T to use in the tests is chosen
to minimize the trigger time while maintaining reliable tests. If any of these tests pass (H i
accepted), a trigger flag FTi is set to TRUE.
Now that the basic structure of the trigger test has been chosen, the whitening prefilter is
inserted. To choose the threshold, consider the test statistic STi(k ) under the truth model.
Equations (5) to (21), (66), and (67) are used to compute the variance ]El of the sum of N T
residuals by using the truth model as previously described. The conditional means and variance
of the test statistic are
var (STi(k) ) =a2sTi = PTIEfPi
The variance a2Ti is then used in equation (26) to determine the threshold tTi , as was done
previously for the actuator-path trigger test.
The remaining step in the design of the trigger test is the computation of the projection
vector Pi. The projection vector is chosen to optimize the d2 metric for the test statistic
ST_(k); the signal-to-noise ratio for the given values of the failure signal s i = Bifs and noise
]El is thus maximized, and the probabilities of detection and false alarm are improved. For the
truth model
T 2
(NTPi Bifs) (73)
from equations (36) and (72). Weiss (ref. 25) has shown that d 2 is maximized by choosing Pi
such that
Pi = KlE-flBifs (74)
where K is any scalar constant. Normally, K is chosen to normalize the projection vector to
unity magnitude, such that Pi becomes
(72)
_-IBi
Pi=
, ,,11/2 (75)
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Theminimumsignalmagnitudefs/ required to achieve the desired value (2Ks) 2 of d 2 can now
be computed from equations (72) and (73) as follows:
In quest of robustness to modeling errors, the projection vectors are examined to determine
if any components can be eliminated (set to zero). The criteria are as follows: eliminate the jth
component of Pi and recompute a}Ti, tTi, and fsi. If fsi changes insignificantly (e.g., less than
5 percent) from its previous value, then the jth component of Pi is set to zero, and modeling
errors in the corresponding component of the residual are not reflected into the test statistic.
Otherwise it is restored to its original value. This procedure is repeated for each component of
the projection vector. To account for the unknown sign of fs, the absolute value of STi (k) is
taken before comparing it with the threshold. With this addition, the design of the trigger test
is complete, and the final test is shown in figure 9.
v (k)
. _ S T (k) r--------_S'Ti (k) I
High-pass _filter
Figure 9. Aircraft-path trigger test.
tT_"i _ Trigger%i
Verify tests. The verify tests in the aircraft path are SPRT's similar to those in the actuator
path. The difference is that, since the aircraft-path residual sequence u(k) is a vector sequence,
a projection vector Pi must be incorporated, as in the trigger tests, and this vector results in
the verify test shown in figure 10. Before proceeding with the design, note that when using the
truth model, the statistics of S_ (k) are
. (k)IH }=kCAeTBJs--
{S (k)IHO}=-kC. (77)
--Sv(k)_LV I tvi _ FV i
Figure 10. Aircraft-path verify test.
After the maximum test length N V is selected, the projection vector is chosen to maximize the
d 2 metric at the end of the maximal length test (k = NV).
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_ (NvPTB s )2
PTEf(Nv)Pi
As with the trigger test, the result is that Pi is given by equation (74) as
(78)
Pi = KE fl(Nv)Bifs
If N V = N T, then the projection vectors for the verify tests are identical to those in the trigger
tests.
The remaiiling parameters (GAi, GDi, and tvi ) are chosen by using the following four-step
procedure described for the actuator-verify tests:
1. Determine what value of the failure signal fsi produces a verify test at sample N V that
is reliable according to the d 2 metric; that is,
(79)
where 2Ka is the desired value of d.
2. Let
GA i = pTBifsi = si ]
T - 2
(8O)
3. Determine the value kti of k for which the d2 metric equals or exceeds 2 in [(1 - PE)/PE];
that is, solve the following for kti:
T - 2 pi]
_> 2 In [(1 - PE)/PE] (81)
4. Set the threshold tv/ equal to the mean value of SVi (kti) as follows:
_ kt_ (82)
Whenever the ith verify-test statistic exceeds this threshold, the ith verify flag F_ is set to
TRUE (1). If the test statistic becomes less than -tvi , FV/is set to FALSE (0). Otherwise, F_
remains undecided (2). This completes the design of the verify tests.
Isolate tests. The purpose of the isolate tests is to help decide which surface failed when a
trigger test and a verify test have passed. The isolate tests are initiated by the trigger tests
and operate in parallel with the verify tests. The isolate tests are designed to decide between
two hypotheses, H i and Hi, which represent failures in the ith and jth surfaces, respectively.
In reality, of course, both of these may be false. Ambiguities that result from these tests are
resolved by a subsequent algorithm.
30
As a designmodel,assumethat the residualvectorsequencev(k) is composed of either of
two constants Bifs or Bjfs, plus additive white Gaussian noise nw(k):
Hi: vd(k ) = Bifs + nw(k) /
IHj: vd(k ) Bjfs + nw(k)
(83)
The conditional probability density functions for vd(k ) are
1
Hi: P (vd(k)lHi) = (27r)6/2 [det (]Ew)] 1/2
1
×exp{-i I-d(k)-sizslr r41 ke(k)- sJs]}
1
Hi: p (vd(k)[Hj) = (2_)6/2 [det(]Ew)]l/2
×exp{-l[vd(k)-Sjfs]T_wl [vd(k)-Sjfs]}
(84)
where the covariance matrix ]Ew of nw(k) is diagonal.
One test for deciding between H i and Hj is the sequential probability ratio test shown in
figure 11 and described by
Sii/j (k-k r+ l) = S_/j(k-k r+ l) -IS_/i(k-k T+ I)]
k
E 7j(m)
m=k T
k
- E
m=k T
_i(m) (85)
If SI, Ij (k - k T - 1) > tIilj,
If - tii/j < Sii/j (k - k T + 1) < tii/j,
If Sli/j (k - k T - 1) < --tii/j,
then decide Hj (FIffj :O)
then take another sample (Fii/j
then decide H i (Fii/j = 1)
where kT is the trigger time. The absolute values have been used because the signs of the failure
signals Bifs and Bjfs are unknown. As with the verify tests, a maximum test length N I is
selected. The other parameters of the test (Pi/j, Pill, and tIi/j ) are chosen using the truth
model. The random component of the residuals in the truth model is the same as that used in
the aircraft-path verify tests. The signals, or mean values, under the two hypotheses are the
same as in the design model discussed previously.
With this truth model and this test structure, and if the absolute-value functions are
neglected, the relevant statistics for the isolate test are (where k is the number of samples
from trigger time to simplify notation)
J (86)
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filter ?i(k)--S7 Sl '3_/Jl tr_
High-pass _ Ii/j
Figure 11. Aircraft-path isolation test.
Isolate
i versus j
Flffj
var [S.Ti(k)lHi,HjJ = P_/j]Ef(k)Pi/j
T 2
d2 (S.yi(k)) = PTi/j_,f(k)Pi/j
(87)
(88)
(89)
a2Sii/j :var [SIi/j(k)lHi'Hj]
<- PTi/j_Ef(k)Pi/j + Py/i]Ef(k)Pj/i (90)
- P_j_/'(k)Pi/_ + P_i_;('_k)--Pj/i (91)
The following procedure, which is similar to that used for the verify tests, is used to choose the
parameters for the isolate tests:
i. Choose the projection operator Pi/j to maximize the sensitivity of the test to the ith
failure while making it minimally sensitive to the jth failure. This is done by selecting
Pi/j to maximize d 2 (S*ri (NI)), subject to the constraint
P_jBj -- 0 (92)
Weiss (ref. 25) has shown that the solution is given by
[ BT_-fl(NI)Bj J= - Bj (93)Pi/j K_3f I (NI) Bi BT:E_I (NI)Bj
where K is chosen to normalize Pi/j to unit length; Pj/i is similarly computed.
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2. Determine the minimum failure-signal amplitude fsi/j that produces the desired value of
d 2 (SIi/j (NI)) for the maximal length test (eq. (91)):
KaasIi/J (94)
 i/j - Nr
3. Determine the threshold tI_/j by setting it equal to the expected value of the test
statistic at the same stage (sample number) kti/j in the test at which the d 2 metric
is 2 In [(1 - PE)/PE]; PE is the desired minimum probability of error in the test. This is
done by using the minimum signal amplitude si/j from step 2 and solving
4k2 _2/ j
> 2 ln[(1 - RE)/RE]
o2 (k) -
S_/j
(96)
for the minimum value kii/j of k that satisfies equation (96). Then, the threshold tii/j is
given by
tIi/j = E [SIi/j (kli/j) Hi]
/3 /J /J
(97)
4. As with the trigger-verify projection vectors, examine each component of the Pi/j to
determine whether that component can be eliminated without severely affecting nominal
performance. The criterion is as follows: eliminate the mth components of Pi/j and Pj/i
by eliminating the ruth components of B i and Bj and recomputing Pi/j and Pj/i by
using equation (93). Recompute ]si/j and is j  i. If ]si/j + fsj/i changes insignificantly
(e.g., less than 5 percent) from its previous value, use the new values of Pi/j and Pj/i
with zero ruth components. Otherwise, return to the previous vectors Pi/j and Pill"
This procedure is repeated for each component of the projection vectors. New thresholds
tii/j are then computed by using equation (97) and thus completing the design of the
isolation tests.
Ambiguity resolution. The isolation test is performed for each pair of potential failures, and
the result of each test is a decision that the ith failure is more likely than the jth, that the jth
failure is more likely than the ith, or that more data are needed (take another sample). For an
aircraft with n actuators, there are n(n - 1)/2 of these decisions. Further processing is required
to isolate the failure to a particular surface, if possible, based on the results of these pairwise
decisions.
During the FDI process, several flags are set. As previously noted, the trigger flag FT, verify
flags F_, and isolate flags FIi/j are set by the trigger, verify, and isolate tests, respectively. On
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succeedingsamples,if a flag is undecided,the test isperformedagain.Oncea verifyor isolate
decisionis madeandthe correspondingflag is setto 1or 0, that test is not repeatedand the
flag is not changedunlessa falsetrigger is declared.The flagsare then reinitialized,and the
FDI processrestarts.
During theambiguityresolutionprocessafailureflag F F is set to TRUE to indicate that an
aircraft-path failure has been detected and isolated, and a confusion flag FC is set to TRUE to
indicate that the isolation process has not isolated the failure to a particular surface but only
to a group of surfaces called the confusion set.
Because stabilizer and elevator failure effects are so similar, the FDI system cannot distin-
guish between these failures. Therefore, the system attempts to isolate a failure in one of these
surfaces only to the left horizontal tail or the right horizontal tail. In this case, the confusion
flag is set to TRUE, and the confusion set is compiled. Once an aircraft-path failure has been
isolated, including isolation to the left or right horizontal tail, the aircraft-path subsystem ceases
to process data. (The current FDI system cannot accommodate multiple aircraft-path failures.)
In some cases, results of the verify and isolate tests lead to detection of a failure that cannot be
isolated. In these cases, an undetermined aircraft-path failure is declared, the confusion flag is
set to TRUE, and the confusion set is compiled. However, the false-trigger flag is set to TRUE,
and on the next sample the system reinitializes the flags and continues to search for a failure.
The ambiguity resolution procedure is illustrated in flowchart form in figure 12. The salient
features of the procedure are as follows:
1. If all verify tests fail, a false trigger is declared and the FDI process is reinitialized
2. If the verify test for the ith surface passes and all pairwise isolation tests pass in favor of
the ith surface, the ith surface is declared failed; if this surface is either the left or right
horizontal tail, the confusion flag is set and the confusion set is compiled
3. If each of the surfaces satisfies one of the following:
a. The verify test fails
b. The verify test is undecided and the surface fails all of its pairwise isolation tests
c. The verify test passes and there are no undecided isolation tests for this surface
then an undetermined failure is declared, the confusion flag is set to TRUE, and a
confusion set is compiled that consists of the potential failed surfaces; if the confusion
set is empty, a false trigger is declared, and the aircraft path is reinitialized to continue
processing
4. Otherwise, another sample is taken, and the process continues
Design Results
Using the methodology described in the section "Design Concept," a baseline FDI system
was designed (ref. 25) for the modified 737 aircraft for subsequent evaluation via nonlinear
simulation. This section contains the results of this design process for the baseline design.
Actuator-Path Subsystem
Application of the design methodology requires knowledge of the parameters for the actuator
models. Values used in the baseline design for the actuator dynamics, namely cutoff frequency,
position limits, rate limits, and cable stretch factor, are shown in table 2. Some engine pa-
rameters are not shown since, as previously noted, the model used for the engines is more
complicated than the generic first-order system with position and rate limits used for the other
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Yes_
No_
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Performverify ]tests on i
undecided surfaces [
I Perform ieolate [tests on I
undecided surfaces ])..
tests failed _ trigger flag
"_ I toTRUE
I Set finishedflag to TRUE
l
surface i
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No
No
No
Yes Set finished ]
SE ]
Figure 12. Aircraft-path subsystem logic flowchart.
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flag to TRUE
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Figure 12. Concluded.
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Table 2. Actuator-Model Parameter Values
Surface
Thrust
Stabilizers
Rudder
Elevators
Ailerons
Cutoff
frequency,
wa, rad/sec
(a)
1.5
22
22
20
Position limits,
deg
bl.54 b13.77
--14 3
--10.3 10.3
--10 10
--20 20
Rate limits,
deg/sec
(al
+10
+18
+20
±20
Stretch
factor
0
0
0
.0023
.0016
HPF cutoff
frequency,
rad/sec
0.01
I
aThrottle-EPR-thrust relationship in actuator model is nonlinear.
bThrust in lb × 103, corresponds to limits of 0 ° and 40 ° on throttle.
actuators. Values for the noise, or error, terms in the model are shown in table 3. The low-
frequency error terms were determined by the following procedure. The nonlinear simulation
(described subsequently) was run for doublet maneuvers in roll, pitch, and sideslip. For each
actuator, the residuals u(k) that resulted from comparison of the measurement of surface
position with the position predicted by the actuator model were examined, and the maximum
error (residual) magnitudes were determined. These worst-case errors Ewc were assumed to
approximate the three-standard-deviation (3a/) values for the low-frequency noise. The values
for the white noise aw were twice the standard deviation of the white noise assumed for the
sensors that measure the actuator positions. These values were then used to design trigger and
verify tests for each actuator.
Table 3. Errors for Actuator-Path Truth Model
Actuator
Thrust
Stabilizers
Rudder
Elevators
Ailerons
Standard deviation
of white noise,
aw, deg
a0.02
.2
.2
.2
.2
Worst-case
low-frequency
noise, Ewc, deg
al.5
.5
3.0
.75
.50
Standard deviation
of low-frequency
noise, at, deg
a0.5
.167
1.0
.25
.167
aThrust in lb × 103.
One-half second was selected as the window of samples for the fixed-sample trigger test,
and similarly one-half second was chosen as the maximum time for the verify SPRT. At
20 samples/sec, this window corresponds to 10 samples for N T and N V. The low-frequency
cutoff for the high-pass filters was selected to be 0.01 rad/sec.
Trigger tests. To determine the trigger thresholds using equation (26), we need to know the
factor Ka that corresponds to the desired probability of error and aSr, the standard deviation of
the trigger-test statistic. It was assumed that the low-frequency noise in the residuals was nearly
constant over the 0.5-sec trigger-test window. The variance of S T was then approximated as
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or
a2 (98)
a___E__w
_ST _ ag + 2 V_ (99)
A probability of error of 2.7 × 10 -3 corresponds to Ka = 3. These values were then used to
calculate the trigger thresholds according to equation (26), or
tT = KaasT
Results are listed in table 4. Equation (26) produced a threshold of 3.1 ° for the rudder. However,
because of a problem with false alarms in the rudder test during simulation, the threshold was
increased to 4.1 ° for the baseline design.
Table 4. Baseline-Design Results for Actuator-Path Subsystem
Surface NT tT, deg N V tv, deg _, deg G A G D
10 10 1.0Thrust
Stabilizers
Rudder
Elevators
Ailerons
al.6
.6
4.1
.85
.6
a7.5
2.5
2O
3.75
2.5
%.0
1.0
6.0
1.5
1.0
1.5
.5
3.0
.75
.5
aThrust in lb × 103.
Verify tests.
detectable signal _ by using equation (40) as follows:
N_ _2 _ (2Ka) 2
d2 (Nv) = a2 v (Uv)
The number of samples has been chosen to be 10, and Ka = 3 as in the trigger test.
variance of the verify statistic is approximated as
a2sv (Nv ) _ N_/a2
Therefore,
The first step in the design of the verify test is to determine the minimally
The
= 2Kaag = 2Ewc
(100)
(101)
With this approximation for the variance of ST, the minimally detectable signal _ and the
metric d 2 are independent of N V (and k). The gains G A and G D can now be determined
from equations (41). The next step in the design is to determine the value k t at which
d 2 (S V (kt)) > 2 In [(1 -DE)/PE]. Since 42 is independent of k, this step is omitted, and
the verify threshold is set equal to the expected value of the verify statistic at sample NV/2 as
follows:
NVS -- 5Ewc (102)tv = E{Sv(Nv/2)} - 4
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Resultsare shownin table 4. Becauseof the false-alarmproblemswith the rudder, the
computedvalueof 15.0 for the rudder-verify threshold was increased to 20.0 for the baseline
design.
Aircraft-Path Subsystem
Design of the aircraft-path subsystem requires that the variances Ew and IEg of the white
and low-frequency errors in the truth model of the residuals (eqs. (66)) be determined. In this
case, the residuals and, thus, the error terms are six-component vectors, but the covariance
matrices are assumed to be diagonal.
The white-noise term is produced by the noise on the various sensor outputs and propagated
into the residuals in the following manner. Consider, for example, the x-acceleration component
vx(k) of the residuals. From equations (60) and (61),
vx(k) = A c - X/m
mx
= A C _ __
mx o_s Cxo+ cxo.c(k) + 2- roCxqqm()+
m i
AC ?tScxo - [-AllW0 + (Q0 + A12) U0] ac_(k)
= mx m
-[W0 + A13]qm(k) - E BliSmi (k)
i
= ATnx(k ) _ OS C
-- xo - _ CxjSmj(k) (10a)
m
J
where the Cxj's are the dimensional stability and control derivatives listed in table 5, and the
5mj (k)'s are the measurements from the aircraft sensors. The variance a2wx of the white-noise
component of the error in Vx(k) can be determined from
= C jj22 (104)
J
Table 5. Dimensional Stability and Control Derivatives
Force or
moment o, I fl, p,
axis deg deg deg/sec
"_, ft/sec 2 0.576 0 0
_, ft/sec 2 0 -.663 .0131
_, ft/sec 2 -3.60 i 0 0
/b, rad/sec 2 0 -.0829 -.0347
Q, rad/sec 2 -.0327 ' " 0
[_, rad/sec 2 0 ' .0159 -.00267 I
q, r, Thrust, iStabilizer,
deg/sec .... deg/sec lbx103 l[ deg
0.000309 0 0.342 I 0.0211
0 .0372 0
-.00355 0 -.00474 I -.248
0 .0124 ±.0021 1 =t=.0119
-.0113 0 .006201 -.036
0 -.00305 ±.0124 { ±.050883
I
Rudder, Elevator, Aileron, ]Spoiler,
deg deg deg [ deg
0 0.00989 0.0113 I-0.0181
.202 0 +.00179 I +.0185
0 -.116 -.133 ! .133
.0147 4-.00556 &.0118 I +.013
0 -.0167 -.00473 I .0019_
-.0174 I ±.000506 ±.000559. l-1-.002
where a2 x is the variance of the noise on the x-accelerometer output, and a 2 is the variance of
the white noise on the jth measurement. The values for aj are the same as the values used in
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the simulation.Theotherfivediagonaltermsof Elwarecomputedin asimilarmanner,andthe
resultsareshownin table6.
A dominantcomponentof the low-frequencyerror in the residualsis producedwhenerrors
in the aircraft model (the derivatives)areexcitedby aircraft motion and surfacedeflections.
The magnitudesof the low-frequencyerrorscanbeestimatedasshownin reference25. One
techniqueis to estimatethe maximumerror in the stability and control derivatives,estimate
the varianceof the measuredparameters(suchasangleof attack andsurfacedeflections)that
multiply thesederivatives,andcomputethevariancesof the low-frequencyerrors,muchlikethe
computationof the white-noisevariancesin equation(103).For the baselinedesign,however,
the varianceof the low-frequencyerrorwasdeterminedanotherway,muchlike it wasdonefor
the actuator-pathsubsystem.Theaircraft wasflownin simulationin a climbingturn with no
turbulence.Residualsv(k) werecalculated,and the worst-case rrorsweredetermined.The
error standarddeviationsa t were then set equal to two-thirds of the worst-case errors. The
resulting values are shown in table 6. The cutoff frequency of the low-frequency error model
was selected to be 2 rad/sec (a t = 0.905 in eq. (6)). The values of af(20) are the square roots
of the diagonal terms of ]El(N) for N = 20.
The cutoff frequency of the high-pass filter was chosen to be 0.5 rad/sec. The window length
for the trigger tests was chosen to be 1 sec, or 20 samples. The maximum length for the verify
and isolate SPRT's was similarly selected to be 20 samples. Using these data in the truth model,
the Lyapunov equation was solved for each of the six components of the residual as previously
described to compute the diagonal terms of ]El(20). Results are listed in table 6.
Trigger tests. The projection vector Pi, which will operate upon the residuals v(k) in the
trigger test for the ith surface, was computed from equation (75), and the resulting vectors
are shown in table 7. The test statistic for the ith trigger test is given by equation (69). The
variance a_7. of the test statistic was computed by using equation (72). By using equation (26)
and a value of 3.1 for Ka, which corresponds to a probability of error of 2 x 10 -3, the thresholds
for the trigger tests were computed, and the results are listed in table 7. For the test statistic,
the software used in the simulation actually uses
STi(k) =
k
E PT (J)
j=k-NT+I
k
- E _p/Tpi (105)
j=k-ir+l
( "1Since E l STi HO) = NT/2, the trigger thresholds actually used in the simulation were
calculated using
tT_ = Kaasr_ NT (106)2
The minimum value ]si of the failure that will produce a reliable test at sample N T according
to the d 2 metric was calculated from equation (76) with Ka = 3.1.
Each projection vector Pi was then examined to determine which components contributed
significantly to the reliability of the detection process. Each of the six components of Pi were
set to zero one at a time, and a new value for the minimum signal ]si was computed. If the ratio
of the new value to the previous value was less than 1.05, the component of Pi being examined
was kept at zero. Otherwise, it was restored to its original value. Using this procedure, new
projection vectors were computed with new thresholds and new values for the minimal detectable
failures. Results are shown in table 8.
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Table 6. Errors for Aircraft-Path Truth Model
Residual
x-acceleration, vx
y-acceleration, vy
z-acceleration, vz
P-acceleration, up
Q-acceleration, VQ
R-acceleration, v R
Standard
deviation of
white noise,
nO- w
0.39 ft/sec 2
.42 ft/sec 2
1.50 ft/sec 2
.035 rad/sec 2
.017 rad/sec 2
.012 rad/sec 2
Low-frequency
noise cutoff,
rad/sec
2.0
Standard
deviation of
low-frequency
noise, bert
0.20 ft/sec 2
.033 ft/sec 2
.20 ft/sec 2
.020 rad/sec 2
.0050 rad/sec 2
.0034 rad/see 2
HPF
cutoff
frequency,
rad/sec
0.5
Standard
deviation of
total noise,
,c_/(20)
2.94 ft/sec 2
1.74 ft/sec 2
6.52 ft/sec 2
.286 rad/sec _
.0925 rad/sec 2
.0642 rad/sec 2
aSquare root
bSquare root
CSquare root
of diagonal terms of Ew.
of diagonal terms of Et.
of diagonal terms of El.
Table 7. Baseline-Design Results for Aircraft-Path Trigger Test Before
Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
parameter
P:
(T S T
f_T
Left
thrust
(vz) 0.0127
(.y) o
(Vz) -.0000360
(Up) .00828
(Vq) .234
(v_) .972
.0760
-9.764
1.32
Right
thrust
0.0127
0
-.0000360
-.00828
.234
-.972
.0760
-9.764
1.32
Left
horizontal
tail
0.00055
0
-.00138
.0344
-.998
.0508
.0933
-9.711
.787
Right
horizontal
tail
0.000577
0
-.OO138
-.0344
-.998
-.0508
.0933
-9.711
.787
Rudder
0
.0158
0
.0424
0
-.9990
.0709
-9.780
1.04
Left
aileron
0.00211
.000962
-.O05O7
.233
-.896
.377
.114
-9.646
4.40
Right
aileron
0.00211
.000962
-.00507
-.233
-.896
-.377
.114
-9.646
4.40
Verify tests. Since the maximum length of the verify SPRT is the same as the length of the
trigger tests (N V = N T = 20), the projection vectors for the verify tests are the same as those
for the trigger tests. The minimum value si of the failure that produces a reliable test at sample
N V according to the d 2 metric was calculated from equation (79) by using Ka = 3.1. Since
N V = NT, aim the same value of Ka was used for the trigger and verify tests, the values of ]si
are the same as the final values from the trigger tests (after the insignificant components of Pi
were set to zero). The gains GAi and GDi were then determined from equations (80). Using
PE = 1 x 10 -3, the verify thresholds were then computed with equation (82) after determining
kti from equation (81). Results are shown in table 9.
Isolate tests. The maximum length of the isolate SPRT's was chosen to be 1 sec (N I = 20),
and the projection vectors Pi/j were computed from equation (93). Minimum-failure signal
amplitudes for reliable detection were computed from equations (94) and (95) by using Ka = 3.1
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Table 8. Baseline-Design Results for Aircraft-Path Trigger Test After
Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
parameter
P:
(-y)
(-p)
(_q)
(-r)
as_
tT
f _T
Left
thrust
0.0131
0
0
0
0
.9999
.0749
-9.768
1.38
Right
thrust
Left
horizontal
tail
0.0131
0
0
0
0
-.9999
.0749
-9.768
1.38
0
0
0
-1.0
0
.0925
-9.713
.796
Right
horizontal
tail
0
0
0
0
-1.0
0
.0925
-9.713
.796
Rudder
0
.0159
0
0
0
-.9999
.0699
-9.783
1.05
Left
aileron
0
0
0
.252
-.968
0
.115
-9.644
4.72
Right
aileron
0
0
0
-.252
-.968
0
.115
-9.644
4.72
Table 9. Baseline-Design Results for Aircraft-Path Verify Test After
Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
_arameter
GA
GD
kT
tv
Le_
thrust
0.0232 lb × 103
.0232
.00027
6
.00162
Right
thrust
0.0232 lb × 103
.0232
.0O027
6
.00162
Left
horizontal
tail
0.0287 °
.0287
.00041
7
.00288
Right
horizontal
tail
0.0287 °
.0287
.00041
7
.00288
Rudder
0.0217 °
.0217
.00023
7
.00164
Left
aileron
0.0356 o
.0356
.00063
6
.00381
Right
aileron
0.0356 °
.0356
.00063
6
.00381
and PE = 1 × 10 -3. Thresholds for the isolate test were then computed by using equation (96)
to find kii/j and equation (97) to find tii/j.
As with the trigger-verify projection vectors, the isolate projection vectors Pi/j were
examined to set to zero any vector component that contributed insignificantly to the isolate
process. In this case, a value of 1.2 was used as the test of significance for the ratio of minimum
signal amplitudes (fi/j + fj/i)new/(fi/j ÷ fj/i)old" Results are listed in table 10.
Baseline-Design Simulation Results
Simulation Description
The simulation used to evaluate the baseline FDI system was a six-degree-of-freedom
nonlinear digital simulation of a transport airplane. The airplane model was a modified 737.
The aerodynamics and controls were changed to allow for separate surface operation of the
right and left ailerons, elevator, and stabilizer; that is, the right and left surfaces could be
controlled individually. Also, the speed of response of the stabilizer was improved by modeling
the actuator as a first-order system with a time constant of 1.5 sec. This change was made
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sothat the stabilizerwouldbe a moreusefulredundantsurfacein the restructurable-controls
studies.Positionandrate limits wereincludedin the model.
Table10. Baseline-DesignResultsfor Aircraft-PathIsolateTestAfter
Projection-VectorOptimization
Design
parameter
aS,i/j :
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(R_)
(LA)
(RA)
_i/j:
(LT)
(RT)
(nil)
(RH)
(R_)
(LA)
(RA)
ki/j:
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(nu)
(LA)
(RA)
tIi/j :
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(Ru)
(LA)
(RA)
Left
thrust
Right
thrust
0.176
0.0273
0.164
Left
horizontal
tail
0.109
.109
0.0168
.0168
0.118
.118
Right
horizontal
tail
0.109
.109
.387
0.0168
.0168
.0599
0.118
.118
.300
Rudder
0.336
.336
.113
.113
0.0521
.0521
.0175
.0175
0.365
.365
.122
.122
Left
aileron
0.110
.132
.306
.306
.132
0.0170
.0204
.0474
.0474
.0205
0.119
.123
.237
.237
.123
Right
aileron
0.132
.ll0
.306
.306
.132
.193
0.0204
.0170
.0474
.0474
.0205
.0300
0.123
.119
.237
.237
.123
.180
The simulation included provisions for simulating failures in each of the controls: left throttle,
right throttle, left stabilizer, right stabilizer, rudder, left elevator, right elevator, left aileron,
and right aileron. Each surface could be failed to stick at its current position, to stick at a
neutral (trim) position, to stick at hardover position, or to lose part of its effectiveness. In the
neutral and hardover failures, the actuator command was set to the failed position at the time
of failure, and this command was then propagated through the actuator dynamics to determine
the surface position as a function of time. For the partial-surface loss, the command to the
actuator was set at the time of failure to the commanded (desired) position multiplied by the
percent effectiveness due to the failure.
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The simulationincludedthecapabilityto simulateatmosphericturbulenceandsteady-state
winds. Turbulencewasmodeledaccordingto the Drydenspectra.
Aircraft sensorsmodeledin thesimulationincludedattitudegyros,rategyros,body-mounted
accelerometers,aninertialnavigationsystem,anair-datasystem,alphaandbetavanes,actuator
positionsensors,enginepressureratio (EPR) sensors,and a microwavelandingsystem.The
modelsprovidedfor white Gaussiannoise,bias,scalefactor,andalignmenterrorsin thesensor
measurementsasappropriate.Sensordynamicswerenot included.Valuesfor the errorscanbe
foundin table 11.
Table11. SensorErrorsUsedin Simulation
Sensor
Altitude gyros:
O
qJ
Attitude rates:
P
Q
R
White-noise
error, la
0.23 °
.23 °
.23 °
0.02 deg/sec
.02 deg/sec
.02 deg/sec
Bias error
-0.23 °
.23 °
-.23 °
Scale-factor
error
0
0
0
Angle of attack, a 0.4 ° 0.25 ° 0
Sideslip, fl 0.4 ° 0.25 ° 0
0.32 ff/sec 2
.32 if/see 2
.32 if/see 2
0.32 ft/sec 2
.32 ft/sec 2
.32 ft/sec 2
Accelerometers:
ax
ay
az
0.0025
.0025
.0025
Misalignment
error
0
0
0
0
0
a0.2, --.2, .25
a.2, --.2, .25
%2, --.2, .25
True airspeed, VT 2.5 ft/sec 4.0 ft/sec 0 0
Thrust 0.01 lb x 103 0.02 lb x 103 0 0
Surface positions 0.1 ° 0.1 ° 0 0
aMisalignment in degrees for (I,, O, and _, respectively.
The control laws and the FDI algorithms implemented in the simulation were developed by
Alphatech (refs. 25, 26, 37, and 38) in their restructurable-controls studies. This implementation
was accomplished by integrating into the Langley simulation the software produced by Alphatech
to simulate a restructurable flight control system. The control laws were the baseline linear
quadratic (LQ) control system described in reference 38. Input commands to the control
system to perform simulated maneuvers were perturbations in pitch 9, x-velocity u, roll ¢, and
y-velocity v. The maneuver used for most of the evaluation runs was a climbing turn beginning
at 10 sec into the run. This maneuver, denoted CT4 and illustrated in figure 13, consists of a
15-sec bank right and a 34-sec pitch-up. Most runs lasted 60 sec, with failures at 5 sec.
The FDI system was the baseline design described in the previous section. Values for the
actuator subsystem design parameters were the same as those in reference 25, except for the
rudder as previously noted. The aircraft-path subsystem design parameters were similar to, but
slightly different than, those presented in reference 25.
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Figure 13. Climbing-turn maneuver CT4.
Roll, deg
No-Turbulence Results
Actuator-Path Subsystem
The performance of the FDI system in detecting and isolating actuator-path failures under
zero atmospheric turbulence conditions was evaluated by simulating three different types of
failures for each of five actuators. These were single-point failures; that is, the failures occurred
one at a time, and there was a separate simulation run for each failure. The three types of failures
were current position--at the failure time, the failed actuator stuck at its last calculated position;
neutral--at the failure time, the actuator was driven to its trim position through the actuator
dynamics; and hardover--at the failure time, the actuator was driven to a hardover position
through the actuator dynamics. Each failure occurred at t = 5 sec, and the climbing-turn
maneuver was initiated at t = 10 sec.
As can be seen from the results shown in table 12, all the failures were detected and
correctly isolated; this was accomplished with only one false alarm. Except for the rudder,
the current position and neutral failures were not detected until the maneuver began, because
in nonmaneuvering flight in zero turbulence, there is little actuator activity. Also, the detection
times for the current position and neutral failures are similar. Because of the small actuator
excursions prior to the maneuver, the current position failures caused the actuator to be stuck
in a position not far from neutral (trim). All current position and neutral failures except
the throttle were detected and correctly isolated within 1 sec after maneuver initiation. The
longer time needed to detect the throttle failure was due in large part to the slower change in
commanded throttle position and the considerably slower throttle-thrust dynamic response. As
would be expected, the hardover failures were detected much more quickly than the current
position and neutral failures; all hardover failures except throttle were detected in less than
0.5 sec. While the quicker detection of hardover failures was anticipated, it was also necessary,
since a haxdover failure can place the aircraft in danger more quickly. The one false alarm
was a rudder false alarm in the aircraft-path subsystem; this false alarm occurred after the
actuator-path subsystem had correctly detected a hardover rudder failure.
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Table 12. Simulation Results for Actuator-Path Failures, No Turbulence
Failure
Right throttle
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Detection/isolation times, a sec
Current
12.60
6.00
.70
5.60
5.40
Neutral Hardover
3.25
5.95 .30
1.10 .45
5.60 .25
5.50 .25
Failed actuator position, b deg
Current Neutral
-1.10 0
-0.07 0 d_ 14
-1.80 10
-0.44 -10
1.30 .. -10
False alarms c
Hardover Current Neutral Hardover
0
r
aVerify time relative to failure time.
bRelative to trim.
Clncludes both actuator-path and aircraft-path false alarms.
dAbsolute, not relative to trim.
Illustrations of the data produced by the FDI actuator-path subsystem are shown in
figures A1 and A2 in the appendix for a failure of the right aileron stuck at its current position
at t = 5 sec. For each of the nine actuators, figure A1 contains plots of the commanded actuator
position, the measured position, and the position estimated by the actuator model. Figure A1
also contains plots of the residual for each actuator before and after high-pass filtering. Figure A2
contains plots of the trigger statistic and the trigger threshold and plots of the verify statistic
and verify thresholds for each actuator. For the convenience of the reader, those time histories
pertaining to the right aileron are repeated in figure 14. At t = 5 sec the measured right-aileron
position sticks at about 1.3 ° and the right-aileron residual increases at this point. The residual
becomes much larger when the maneuver begins (t = 10 sec). The squared-off appearance of the
residual is the result of limiting in the plotting program to prevent the plot from going off scale.
There is no noticeable change in the other actuator residuals as a result of the failure. Also,
the right-aileron trigger statistic crosses its threshold at least three times, twice prior to the
maneuver. It can be seen from the plot that, in response to the triggers before the maneuver,
the verify statistic begins to accumulate but the time limit is exceeded before reaching either
threshold. When the maneuver begins and the residuals are larger, the verify statistic crosses
the threshold and correctly detects and isolates a right-aileron failure 0.1 sec after the trigger.
The trigger and verify statistics are limited by the plotting program. There were no triggers in
any of the other actuator tests. After the failure is detected and isolated (fig. 14), the control
system continues to command the right aileron. A restructurable control system would at that
point cease commanding the right aileron and distribute control among the remaining effectors.
Aircraft-Path Subsystem
The performance of the baseline FDI system in detecting and isolating aircraft-path failures
under zero atmospheric turbulence conditions was evaluated by simulating a loss of surface
effectiveness, or a partially missing surface, for each of the four types of surfaces: stabilizer,
rudder, elevator, and aileron. Aircraft-path failures of the throttle-engine combination were not
implemented in the simulation. These were single-point failures; that is, the failures occurred
one at a time, and there was a separate simulation run for each failure. The aircraft-path
subsystem was not designed to detect multiple failures. Each failure occurred at t = 5 sec, and
the climbing-turn maneuver CT4 was initiated at t = 10 sec.
Results of the simulation that demonstrates the performance of the aircraft-path subsystem
are shown in table 13 as a function of the percent effectiveness of the failed surface. To a
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Figure 14. Rightiaileron position, residual, trigger statistic, and verify statistic for stuckiat-current-position failure
with no turbulence.
first-order approximation the percent of the surface that is missing equals 100 minus the percent
effectiveness. All four failures, right stabilizer, rudder, right elevator, and right aileron, were
detected with the surface at 60-percent effectiveness. Failures of lesser effectiveness were not
simulated, because they would be easier to detect and isolate. The stabilizer and rudder failures
were detected in less than 2 sec, while the elevator and aileron failures were detected after
the maneuver began. When the rudder was failed at 80-percent effectiveness, the failure was
detected, but only after a delay of slightly more than 48 sec. Failures of the stabilizer, elevator,
and aileron at 80 percent were not detected. As can be seen in table 13(b), all the failures
at 60-percent effectiveness, except the right elevator, were isolated at least to a confusion set
containing the failed surface. The isolation times were comparable with those with the actuator-
path stuck-at-neutrM and stuck-at-current-position failures, but as expected, detection and
isolation were not as quick as with the hardover failures. The stabilizer failure was isolated to
a confusion set containing the failed surface, since the system was not designed to discriminate
between stabilizer and elevator failures. When the elevator failed, it was not isolated, but an
undetermined failure was declared with the confusion set containing the failed surface. Similarly,
when the rudder was failed at 80-percent effectiveness, the failure was not isolated to the rudder,
but an undetermined failure was declared with the confusion set containing the rudder and the
left throttle. No false alarms were experienced in these simulation runs in either the aircraft-
path or actuator-path subsystems. In fact, no actuator-path triggers were experienced during
these runs. A run with no failures was also made, and no false alarms and only one false trigger
were experienced (table 13(c)).
To illustrate the type of data produced by the aircraft-path subsystem, figures A3 to A6
contain time-history plots of data produced during a simulation run with a partial right-aileron
failure--in particular, a reduction of the aileron effectiveness to 60 percent at t = 5 sec.
Figure A3 shows how the aircraft responds to the failure at t = 5 sec and to the climbing-
turn maneuver CT4 at t = 10 sec. Application of the commanded maneuver illustrated in
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figure 13 produces the elevator, stabilizer, and aileron activity shown in figure A3; as a result,
the aircraft pitches up and rolls right between t = 10 and t = 15 sec. Between 20 and 30 sec,
the aircraft rolls back to where the wings are level, and between 40 and 45 sec it pitches back
down. This maneuver results in a heading change of approximately 45 ° and an altitude increase
of nearly 600 ft, as seen in figure A3.
Table 13. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance of Aircraft-Path Subsystem
Baseline Design With No Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of
percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer 1.15 bND
Rudder 1.95 48.20
Right elevator 7.05 bND
Right aileron 11.70 bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of
percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 07o 20% 407O 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
aSee symbol list for definition.
acs (RS,RE)
Yes
au (LS, RS, RE)
Yes
aND
au (LT, Ru)
aND
aND
(C) False-alarm performance
Random-
sequence set
Number of
triggers
Number of
false alarms
Isolated
surfaceRun
1 1 1 0 56.00
FDI active
time, a sec
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
Figure A4 shows the measured and predicted linear and angular accelerations and the resid-
uals, which are the differences between the measured and predicted values. The plots for the
p channel axe repeated in figure 15. Changes in the accelerations _, _, and p are noticeable
during the maneuver. However, the measured and predicted values track well, so that the resid-
uals, though noisy, do not change significantly as a result of the maneuver. Neither changes in
the accelerations nor in the residuals at the time of the failure are obvious in the plots. The
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Figure 15. Residuals, trigger s_atistic, verify statistic, and isolate statistic for right-aileron partJal]y missing surface
failure (60-percent effectiveness). Baseline design; no turbulence.
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projection vectors in table 8 show that the right-aileron trigger and verify tests only utilize the/_
and _ residuals, Up and Uq, respectively. Residual errors are weighted sums of band-pass-filtered
measurements and were not used in the designs evaluated in this report.
Figure A5 contains plots of the trigger statistics and thresholds and the verify statistics
and thresholds for each of the seven surfaces; the plots for the right aileron are also shown in
figure 15. (The left stabilizer and elevator and the right stabilizer and elevator are combined into
the fictitious left and right horizontal tails.) Because of the relatively small aircraft accelerations
in the no-turbulence environment, there are no triggers before the maneuver begins, even though
the failure has already occurred. (The apparent left-aileron trigger at about t = 1 sec is not
a true trigger, because it occurs during the 4-sec initialization period, when the FDI system is
inhibited.) The first trigger occurs at t = 11.35 sec in the right-aileron channel (fig. 15), but
the time limit on the right-aileron verify test is exceeded without making a decision, and the
other six surfaces verify negatively (no failure) (fig. A5). Additional triggers occur in the right
aileron, right throttle, and left horizontal tail at t = 12.50, 13.70, and 15.35 sec, respectively,
without a failure being declared. Finally, as a result of a right-aileron trigger at t = 16.40 sec,
the right-aileron verify test passes, all right-aileron isolation tests pass, and a right-aileron
failure is correctly declared at t = 16.70 sec (11.70 sec after the failure). The isolate statistics
and thresholds are shown in figure A6 and in figure 15 for the right aileron. All the pairwise
isolation tests involving the right aileron indicate a right-aileron failure. Figures A5 and A6
show that, after the failure is declared, the trigger, verify, and isolate tests cease to function,
because the aircraft-path subsystem is designed to detect only single-point failures.
Results With Turbulence
Actuator-Path Subsystem
As done with no turbulence the performance of the FDI system in detecting and isolating
actuator-path failures while flying in atmospheric turbulence was evaluated by simulating three
different types of failures for each of five actuators. Again, the three types of failures were as
follows: current position--at the failure time, the failed actuator stuck at its last calculated
position; neutral--at the failure time, the actuator was driven to its trim position through the
actuator dynamics; and hardover--at the failure time, the actuator was driven to a hardover
position through the actuator dynamics. As in previous runs, each failure occurred at t = 5 sec,
and the climbing-turn maneuver was initiated at t -- 10 sec.
As can be seen from the results shown in table 14, all the failures were detected and correctly
isolated. In general, the current position and neutral failures were detected significantly faster
than in the no-turbulence case because of the increased actuator activity due to the turbulence.
In fact, all the failures except the right-throttle stuck-at-current-position failure were detected
before the maneuver began, and 11 failures out of 14 were detected in 1 sec or less. The most
significant result from these runs, however, was the occurrence of false alarms. There was one
false alarm in the aircraft-path subsystem in each failure run. In each case, it was a false
detection and isolation of a right-throttle failure soon after the actual failure occurred; the
first trigger occurred before the actual failure. When the aircraft-path failure was isolated, the
aircraft-path subsystem was inhibited, and no further aircraft-path false alarms were possible.
Three 60-see runs were made, with no failures, and different sample sequences were used for
the turbulence in each run. In the three runs, there were a total of seven false alarms, all in the
aircraft path. Since there were no actuator-path false alarms, these no-failure runs are discussed
in the next subsection.
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Table 14. Simulation Results for Actuator-Path Failures, 10-ft/sec Turbulence
Failure
None d
Right throttle
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
5.55
1.15 1.00
.70 .80
.80 .85
.25 1.00
Detection/isolation times, a sec
Current Neutral Hardover
4.40
.35
.95
.30
.40
Failed actuator position, b deg False alarms c
Current Neutral Hardover Current Neutral Hardover
-5.6
.32
2.3
.27
1.3
0
e _ 14
10
-10
-10
aVerify time relative to failure time.
bRelative to trim.
CIncludes both actuator-path and aircraft-path false alarms.
dThree simulation runs with different sample sequences for random noises and turbulence.
eAbsolute, not relative to trim.
d 7
I
Figures A7 and A8 and figure 16 show the data produced by the FDI actuator-path sub-
system for a failure of the right aileron stuck at its current position at t = 5 sec. Comparison of
the plots in figure A7 with those in figure A1 reveals the increased actuator activity and increased
noise on the residuals in the turbulence case, especially in the rudder channel. The residuals are
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Figure 16. Right-aileron position, residual, trigger statistic, and verify statistic for stuck-at-current-position failure
with 10-ft/sec turbulence.
larger in the thrust and rudder channels than in the others because the rudder is more active
than the other surfaces and because the thrust and rudder FDI model errors are larger than the
others. The rudder model in the simulation contains hysteresis and nonlinear rate limits. The
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FDI engine model, while more complex than the other FDI actuator models, is considerably
simpler than the engine model in the simulation. In spite of the increased noise on the residuals,
there are no false alarms in the actuator path, and there is only one false trigger, namely, a
left-throttle trigger shortly after t = 10 sec. (See fig. A8.) As a result of this trigger, the left-
thrust verify test is activated, and the time is exceeded without making a decision. Comparison
of figure 16 with figure 14 shows that the right-aileron verify test passes much more quickly in
the presence of turbulence.
The ability of the actuator-path subsystem to correctly detect failures without false alarms
indicates that this subsystem is performing as anticipated. Although the limited amount
of testing via simulation to this point has not revealed any design deficiencies or any need
for redesign of the actuator-path subsystem, operation in higher turbulence reveals some
deficiencies, as shown subsequently.
Aircraft-Path Subsystem
As stated in the previous section, three simulation runs with no failures were made with
10-ft/sec turbulence and with the aircraft performing the CT4 climbing-turn maneuver. Each
run utilized a different sample sequence for the turbulence. As can be seen in table 15, in the
three runs there were a total of 11 false triggers and 7 false alarms in the aircraft path. Two of
these were right-throttle false failures, and five were classified as undetermined failures, which
allowed the aircraft-path subsystem to continue functioning. To help separate turbulence and
maneuver effects on the false-alarm performance, another run was made in 10-ft/sec turbulence
with no failures and no maneuver. Two aircraft-path false alarms were experienced in this run,
an undetermined failure and a right-throttle failure. One more no-failure run was made with
the CT4 maneuver with less turbulence (4 ft/sec). One false alarm, an undetermined failure,
occurred at t = 42.25 sec. There were seven false triggers at this lower level of turbulence,
because the aircraft-path subsystem operated for a longer period of time.
Table 15. False-Alarm Performance of Baseline Design With 10-ft/sec Turbulence
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set Maneuver triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1
2
3
4
c5
1
2
3
3
1
CT4
CT4
CT4
None
CT4
bRT
bU
bRT,bU
bRT,bU
bU
1.50
2.50
18.50
6.95
56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
c4-ft/sec turbulence.
Figure A9 shows the measured and predicted accelerations and the residuals for the no-failure,
no-maneuver run in 10-ft/sec turbulence, and figure A10 shows the corresponding trigger and
verify statistics. The accelerations are considerably larger and more volatile than those in
figure A4 for the no-turbulence, CT4 maneuver case. Though differences in the residuals are
not as obvious, the trigger statistics in figure A10 are significantly larger than those in figure A5
for the no-turbulence case. In the first 11 sec of the run, there were six false triggers, two false
verifies, one false undetermined failure declaration, and one false right-throttle failure isolation.
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The level of false alarms observed in these runs is obviously unacceptable and indicates that
the truth model for the trigger, verify, and isolate statistics does not account for all the noises,
or errors, introduced by the actuator activity and aircraft motion caused by the turbulence.
Some modification must be made to the design to allow the system to operate in atmospheric
turbulence.
Results With Model Errors
Previous studies (refs. 15, 18, and 22) indicate that one of the biggest problems to be
overcome in FDI systems is the degradation in FDI performance caused by errors in the model
of the plant. As mentioned previously, a primary reason for selecting a decentralized design for
the current FDI system was to improve the robustness to aircraft model errors. These errors can
be caused by the simplicity of the model, by the errors in measuring the basic parameters such
as the aerodynamic coefficients, by variation from component to component, and by departing
from the flight condition for which the FDI system was designed. To evaluate the robustness
of the system, model errors were introduced; a number of simulation runs were completed to
evaluate system performance. The types of model errors and the simulation results are discussed
in the next two subsections.
Actuator-Path Subsystem
Errors were introduced into the actuator-path subsystem by changing the cutoff frequency,
rate limit, position limits, and stretch factor of each of the actuator models for the stabilizers,
rudder, elevators, and ailerons. The amount of error was based on a percentage of the nominal
value, and the percentages for two different cases are tabulated in table 16. No model errors
were introduced into the aircraft-path subsystem in either of these cases.
Table i6. Actuator-Path Model Errors
Model parameter
Cutoff frequency
Rate limit
Upper position limit
Lower position limit
Stretch factor
Left surfaces
-10
-10
5
-5
-15
Model error, percent of nominal
Case 1 Case 2
Right surfaces
and rudder
10
10
-5
5
15
Left surfaces
-25
-25
12.5
-12.5
-37.5
Right surfaces
and rudder
25
25
-12.5
12.5
37.5
Simulation runs were made to evaluate actuator-path subsystem performance with errors in
the actuator models according to the two cases in table 16. Runs were made with no failures
and with a right-stabilizer failure, a rudder failure, a right-elevator failure, and a right-aileron
failure, all without turbulence. One no-failure run with 10-ft/sec turbulence was made for each
of the model-error cases. The failures were identical to the stuck-at-current-position failures
reported in table 12.
Results of the 12 simulation runs are shown in table 17. The table shows that all the failures
were detected and isolated for both cases of model errors. Comparison with table 12 shows that
the detection-isolation times were equal to or less than those with no model error. For case 1,
the case with the smaller model errors, there were no actuator-path false alarms. The one false
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alarm for this case was the previously experienced aircraft-path subsystem right-throttle false
failure in the run with atmospheric turbulence. For the larger model errors of case 2, however,
the results were different. There were two false alarms in the actuator-path subsystem for each of
the no-failure runs; these two false alarms were false failures of the left and right ailerons in both
runs. Two false alarms were also experienced in each of the runs; these false alarms simulated a
rudder failure, a right-elevator failure, and a right-aileron failure. Three false alarms occurred
in the right-stabilizer-failure run. All the false alarms were either left-aileron, right-aileron, or
right-elevator failures. From these data, it seems that failure detection in the actuator-path
subsystem is not a problem with small or moderate model errors, and small model errors can be
tolerated without false alarms. However, as would be expected, false alarms become a problem
as the model errors increase.
Table 17. Simulation Results for Actuator-Path Stuck-at-Current-Position Failures
With No Turbulence and With Model Errors
Failed
surface
None
None d
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Failed actuator
position, a deg
Model-error case 1
False
alarms c
Detection/
isolation
times, b sea
-0.07 5.95
-1.80 .70
-.44 5.60
1.30 1.90
aRelative to trim.
bVerify time relative to failure time.
CIncludes both actuator-path and aircraft-path false alarms.
dWith 10-ft/sec turbulence.
eAircraft-path right-throttle false alarm.
fIncludes one aircraft-path right-throttle false alarm.
Model-error case 2
Detection/
isolation
times, b sec
0
e 1
0 5.95
.70
5.60
.L 1.90
False
alarms c
2
13
3
2
2
2
Aircraft-Path Subsystem
To evaluate aircraft-path subsystem performance with respect to errors in the aircraft model,
errors were introduced into the aircraft-path subsystem model in two ways. The FDI system
design is based on a linear aircraft model at a single operating point described in table 1, and
results previously discussed have been produced with the aircraft operating at that point. The
first method of introducing model errors was to fly the aircraft (in simulation) at operating
points different from that in table 1. Obviously, this technique simulates the performance of
the FDI system as the aircraft departs from the design point, as it would always do during any
flight. The second method of incorporating model errors was to inject random errors into the
values for the aerodynamic and control derivatives that are used in the aircraft-path subsystem.
These errors simulate the inaccuracies in the knowledge of the aircraft parameters, even at the
design operating point. These procedures and the results of the simulation are discussed in the
following two subsections.
Other operating points. When the aircraft was flown at trim case A (see table 18) and the
climbing-turn maneuver CT4 was performed, there was one false trigger in the aircraft-path
55
subsystem, but no false alarms, as summarized in table 19. When this run was repeated with
10-ft/sec turbulence, the same right-throttle false alarm occurred that was experienced in the
nominal trim case.
Table 18. Aircraft Operating Points for Evaluation of Effects of Aircraft-Path Model Errors
Nominal Trim Trim Trim
Parameter trim case A case B case C
Altitude, ft
Indicated airspeed, knots
Flight-path angle, deg
Flaps, deg
Landing gear
3500
160
0
15
Up
5000
175
0
15
Up
1500
140
-3
3O
Down
20000
325
0
0
Up
Table 19. False-Alarm Performance of Aircraft-Path Subsystem at Off-Nominal Trim Points
Run
Trim
case
A
A
B
C
Turbulence,
ft/sec
None
10
None
None
Number of
triggers
Number of
false alarms
0
1
0
c4
Isolated
surface
bRT
bL T, bRT, bR A
FDI active
time, a sec
56.00
.50
56.00
.40
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
qncludes three actuator-path false alarms.
When the aircraft was initialized at trim case B (final approach on a 3 ° glideslope) and the
climbing-turn maneuver was flown, there were no false triggers. Eight simulation runs were
then executed at trim case B, each with an aircraft-path failure, and the results are shown in
table 20. All the failures were detected. At 60-percent effectiveness, detection was a little slower
than at nominal trim for the rudder failure and a little faster for the elevator failure. Although
all failures were detected, isolation was a little more difficult than at nominal trim. Of the
four failures at 60-percent effectiveness, only the stabilizer failure was isolated, and that to a
confusion set (right horizontal tail) containing the right stabilizer as expected. Undetermined
failures were declared as a result of the other three failures. The resulting confusion set contained
the failed surface, except for the aileron failure. For the failures at 40-percent effectiveness, the
rudder and aileron failures were isolated to the correct surfaces, and the stabilizer and elevator
failures were isolated to confusion sets that contained the failed surface. (The right-stabilizer
failure was correctly isolated to the right horizontal tail.)
The aircraft was then initialized at trim case C, which represented a cruise condition at an
altitude of 20,000 ft. Obviously, this condition was a large departure from the nominal trim
for which the system was designed. A false failure of the right aileron was declared by the
aircraft-path subsystem less than 1 sec after the FDI system was activated. It was expected
that false alarms would occur in this case because of the model errors produced by the large
departure from the design point.
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Table 20. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Aircraft-Path Failures With
No Turbulence and Trim Case B
(a) Detection performance
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
0.60
2.30
6.95
6.70
1.I5
8.70
7.10
7.40
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer aCS (RS, RE) aCS (RS, RE)
Rudder Yes aU ( RT,Ru)
Right elevator aCS (LS, RS, LE,RE) au (LS,RS, LE,RE)
Right aileron Yes aU (LS, RS, L E, RE)
aSee symbol list for definition.
Random errors. To evaluate the effect of uncertainties in the aircraft model at the design
point on the performance of the aircraft-path subsystem, simulation runs were made at the
nominal trim point with random errors added to the model parameters. The random errors
were generated by using a sequence of zero-mean, unit-variance, Gaussian, random numbers
that were then multiplied by the desired standard deviation of the error in the model parameter.
If the resulting error exceeded three standard deviations, a new random error was generated for
that parameter. The standard deviations of the errors for the various parameters in the model
are tabulated in table 21 in terms of percent of the nominal value. These percentages were based
on data in reference 39 and on parameter estimation experience at Langley Research Center.
Three no-failure runs were made that simulated the CT4 maneuver with no turbulence. Each
run utilized a different seed for the random-number generator, so that different random errors
were added to the model parameters for each run. In the first run, there were two aircraft-path
false alarms; one was an undetermined (not isolated) failure, and the other was a false failure
of the left throttle. In the second run, there were five false triggers, but no verifies and, thus,
no false alarms. In the third run, there was one false trigger, but no false alarms. These results
are summarized in table 22.
Four additional runs, each with a different surface failed at 60-percent effectiveness, were
made with random-error set C. As can be seen from table 22, the failure was detected in each
case. The stabilizer failure was correctly isolated to the right horizontal tail, but the elevator
failure was incorrectly isolated to the left horizontal tail. Comparisons with similar runs without
model errors in table 13 show that the detection time was the same for the stabilizer failure, but
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Table 21. Standard Deviations of Random Errors Added to Aerodynamic and Control
Derivatives and to Other Model Parameters To Evaluate Model-Error Effects
Parameter
Cxa
Cxq
CX_T
Cx,s
cx ,,
cx A
Cx_sp
Cxo
Cl_
%
ctr
ClOT
Ct_s
CI_R
C_E
ClbA
Clasp
C,o
/x
Mass
b
Standard
deviation,
percent
10
30
5
10
20
10
20
10
5
10
10
4O
2O
10
10
10
5
10
5
1
0.5
0.5
Parameter
Ks
QR
QA
Cmc_
C_q
Cm6T
Cm_s
Crn_R
Crn_E
CrnsA
Cm_sp
Cmo
/r
Standard
deviation,
percent
10
50
30
20
20
5
20
20
20
5
5
i0
5
5
10
5
10
10
5
0.5
Parameter
CZ_
Czq
CZ_T
QA
Cz_
Czo
Cn_
Cnr
C,,_T
C_s
Cn_n
Cn_E
Cn_A
C_s_
C_o
Iz
S
Standard
deviation,
percent
5
2O
5
10
2O
10
20
10
5
5
90
l0
5
i0
5
10
10
10
5
0.5
detection and isolation of the rudder failure took much longer in the presence of model errors.
Detection and isolation of the aileron failure were somewhat faster with model errors, presumably
because the model errors in this case increased the residuals used to detect and isolate a right-
aileron failure. For the elevator failure, isolation (to a confusion set) was incorrectly declared
with model errors present, but only an undetermined (not isolated) failure was declared in the
simulation run without model errors.
Summarizing the effects of model errors, it has been shown that small errors on the order
of 10 percent in the model parameters have little effect on the actuator-path subsystem
performance, although larger errors cause some false alarms. Performance of the aircraft-path
subsystem is not severely affected by moderate departures from the design operating point.
As expected, large departures from the design point produce unacceptable false alarms. At
the design point, nominal errors in the model parameters affected the aircraft-path subsystem
performance, but the effect was not extreme.
Aircraft-Path Subsystem Designs for Operation in Turbulence
As noted previously (see table 15), the baseline (BL) design produced unacceptable perfor-
mance when operating in 10-ft/sec turbulence (a G = 10) because of the false alarms experienced
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Table22. Failure-DetectionandIsolationPerformancefor Aircraft-PathFailuresWith
Random-ModelErrorsandNo Turbulence
(a) Detectionperformance
Failure-detectionimea as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
60% 80%
1.15
47.65
7.90
6.5O
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 600/o 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
aCS ( RS, RE)
Yes
°CS(LS, LE)
Yes
°See symbol list for definition.
(C) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run error set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 A 4 2 bLT,bu 12.70
2 B 5 0 56.00
3 C 1 0 56.OO
°Time aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
by the aircraft-path subsystem. One way to improve false-alarm performance is to increase the
thresholds in the trigger, verify, and isolate tests. Of course, increasing the thresholds affects
the missed-detection and false-alarm performances, and a compromise solution may be required.
An adaptive system may be required in which the thresholds and other parameters are adjusted
as functions of the turbulence level.
Recall that computation of the thresholds utilizes the covariance matrices E/(k) of the sum
of k residuals v(j), and that the values of ]Ef(k) depend on the white-noise and low-pass-noise
covariances, JEw and E_, respectively, of the residuals as determined by the truth model. For
the BL design, Ew was determined by propagating the sensor noise into the residuals, and
]E l was computed from the worst-case residuals experienced during a simulated climbing-turn
maneuver (CT4) without sensor noise or turbulence.
When the CT4 maneuver was flown in 10-ft/sec turbulence without failures (three runs
with different random-number seeds), the aircraft-path residuals were examined, and it was
59
found that the sample variances of some residual components were significantly larger than
the variances in the truth model, particularly for the q component. Furthermore, when the
simulation was flown with sensor noise but without maneuvers, turbulence, or failures, the
sample variances of the residuals were larger than the white-noise variances in the truth model
for the Az, q, and ÷ components. Thus, it appears that the noise variances in the truth model
for the BL design were too small for the turbulence case, and as a result, the covariance matrices
Ef(k) were incorrect and the thresholds were too low.
Nonadaptive Designs for 10-ft/sec Turbulence
Based on the preceding results, the variances a2w of the white noise on the Az, 17, and ÷
residuals were increased, and the new values (diagonals of Ew ) are shown in table 23. Also,
the variances of the low-pass noise (diagonals of Ee) were increased for the turbulence case in
accordance with the simulation results for the climbing turn with and without sensor noise in
10-ft/sec turbulence; these new values are likewise shown in table 23. Also shown in the table
are values for the diagonals af(N) of the covariance matrix El(N) of the sum S(k) of the N
latest residuals for N = 20.
Table 23. Errors for Aircraft-Path Truth Model for New-Threshold Design
Residual
x-acceleration, vx
y-acceleration, uy
z-acceleration, vz
P-acceleration, vp
Q-acceleration, VQ
R-acceleration, v R
Standard
deviation of
white noise,
aO- w
0.39 ft/sec 2
.42 ft/sec 2
1.60 ft/sec 2
.035 rad/sec 2
.026 rad/sec 2
.0157 rad/sec 2
Low-frequency
noise cutoff,
rad/sec
2.0
Standard
deviation of
low-frequency
noise, ba I
0.419 ft/sec 2
.233 ft/sec 2
1.09 ft/sec 2
.020 rad/sec 2
.0130 rad/sec 2
.0169 rad/sec 2
HPF
cutoff
frequency,
rad/sec
0.5
t Standard
deviation of
total noise,
ca[(20)
5.46 ft/sec 2
3.36 ft/sec 2
15.04 ft/sec 2
.286 rad/sec 2
.193 rad/sec 2
.220 rad/sec 2
aSquare root
bSquare root
CSquare root
of diagonal terms of Ew.
of diagonal terms of ]Ei.
of diagonal terms of ]El .
Using these new values for noise variances in the truth model, two new aircraft-path
subsystem designs for operation in 10-ft/sec turbulence were produced. These two designs,
new-threshold (TG) design and new-projection-vector (PV10) design, and the results of their
evaluation via simulation are discussed in the next two subsections.
New- Threshold Design
When new values for the covariance matrices ]Ef(k) are used in the design procedure
discussed in previous sections to design a new aircraft-path subsystem, the trigger thresholds,
projection vectors, verify gains, verify thresholds, and isolate thresholds are all affected. If
an adaptive system is required in order to achieve an acceptable false-alarm/missed-detection
performance, then some of these parameters must be adjusted as functions of turbulence.
Adjusting the projection vectors would be more complex computationally than adjusting the
gains and thresholds, which are scalar quantities. Therefore, in the first of the two new designs,
the new TG design, the projection vectors obtained in the BL design were retained. New
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gains GAi and GD_ and new thresholds tTi , tvi , and tli/j were computed by using the design
procedure with the new covariance matrices ]Ef but retaining the old projection vectors Pi
and Pi/j" Values for the gains and thresholds for the new TG design are shown in table 24.
The trigger and verify thresholds have increased for each of the surfaces. Also, the minimum
detectable trigger and verify signals, ]ST; and _i, have increased; this increase indicates that a
b
larger signal (failure magnitude) is required for reliable detection, as would be expected with
the larger noise variances.
Table 24. Design Results for Aircraft-Path Subsystem for New-Threshold Design
Design
parameter
fST
tT
Left
thrust
4.25
-9.283
0.0717
Right
thrust
4.25
-9.283
0.0717
Left
horizontal
tail
1.66
-9.402
0.0598
Right
horizontal
t_l
1.66
-9.402
0.0598
Rudder
3.41
-9.298
0.0702
Left
aileron
8.22
-9.380
0.0620
Right
aileron
8.22
-9.380
0.0620
GA 0.0717 0.0717 0.0598 0.0598 0.0702 0.0620 0.0620
GD 0.00257 0.00257 0.00179 0.00179 0.00246 0.00192 0.00192
tv 0.00771 0.00771 0.00894 0.00894 0.00738 0.00962 0.00962
0.1058
.1058
.0453
.0453
0.317
.317
.181
.181
0.0648
0.194
0.0459
.0459
.0611
0.184
.184
.305
0.0458
.0469
.0539
.0539
.0463
0.183
.188
.270
.270
.185
0.0459
.0459
0.184
.184
_i/j:
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(nu)
(LA)
(RA)
tzqj :
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(nu)
(LA)
(RA)
0.0469
.0458
.0539
.0539
.0463
.0457
0.188
.183
.270
.270
.185
.228
To evaluate the false-alarm performance of the new TG design, three runs with the CT4
climbing-turn maneuver were made in 10-ft/sec turbulence; each run utilized different random
sequences for the turbulence. Results are summarized in table 25. No false alarms and only two
false triggers were experienced in the three runs for a total of 168 sec of aircraft-path subsystem
operating time, compared with seven false alarms in 22.5 sec for the BL system under the same
conditions.
The performance of the new TG design in detecting and isolating aircraft-path failures under
turbuient conditions (a G = 10 ft/sec) was evaluated by simulating a loss of surface effectiveness,
or a partially missing surface, for each of the four types of surfaces: stabilizer, rudder, elevator,
and aileron. Each failure occurred at t = 5 sec, and the climbing-turn maneuver CT4 was
initiated at t = 10 sec.
Results of the simulation are shown in table 25 as a function of the percent effectiveness
of the failed surface. With the surface at 60-percent effectiveness, the stabilizer, rudder, and
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elevator failures were detected, but the aileron failure was not. The aileron failure at 40-percent
effectiveness was detected. With no atmospheric turbulence, the BL system detected all four
failures at 60-percent effectiveness (table 13). Also, the new TG design took slightly longer to
detect the failures in turbulence than the BL system did with no turbulence. At 40-percent
effectiveness, the stabilizer and elevator failures were detected more quickly by the TG design
than at 60-percent effectiveness, but the stabilizer, rudder, and elevator failures at 80-percent
effectiveness were not detected.
Table 25. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for New-Threshold Design
With 10-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
20% 40%
1.15
7.10
6.50
2.10
3.45
7.35
bND
bND
bND
bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60%
Right stabilizer aCS (RS, RE) aU (LS, RS, LE,RE)
Rudder Yes
Right elevator aCS (RS, RE) aU (RA)
Right aileron Yes aND
80%
aND
aND
aND
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
2 2 1 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
In terms of isolation performance, at 60-percent effectiveness the rudder failure was isolated
correctly, but the stabilizer and elevator failures resulted in undetermined failure declarations.
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In the stabilizer case, the confusion set contained the failed surface, but in the elevator case
it did not. At 40-percent effectiveness, the stabilizer and elevator failures were isolated to the
correct confusion sets. Although there were a few actuator-path triggers, no actuator-path false
alarms were experienced during these runs. In general, the new TG design performed almost as
well in detecting and isolating failures in turbulence as the BL system did in a zero-turbulence
environment, and the false-alarm performance of the new TG design was vastly superior to that
of the BL system in turbulence.
As mentioned previously, it is to be expected that the detection performance of the new
TG design with no turbulence would be degraded from the BL system because the thresholds
have been increased. To evaluate this performance, 15 runs were made with the new TG design
in a no-turbulence environment with various simulated failures. The results are summarized in
table 26. For failed-surface effectivenesses of 0 and 20 percent, failures were detected and isolated
correctly. At 40-percent effectiveness, the aileron failure was not detected, and only the stabilizer
failure was correctly isolated. Detection was quicker for the larger failures. Failures of the
stabilizer, rudder, and elevator at 60-percent effectiveness were not detected. Detection/isolation
performance was not quite as good as in turbulence (table 25), where failures were detected
with smaller failure magnitudes (with 20 percent more effectiveness). Thus, the new TG design
performed well. It did not perform quite as well as the BL system with no turbulence, but much
better than the BL system in 10-ft/sec turbulence.
Table 26. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for New-Threshold Design
With No Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
O%
0.70
1.25
0.65
6.35
20%
0.85
2.65
1.20
6.60
40%
1.15
48.30
7.25
bND
60%
bND
bND
bND
80%
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer aCS (RS, RE) aCS (RS, RE) aCS (RS, RE) aND
Rudder Yes Yes aU (L T ) _N D
Right elevator _C S (RS, RE) aC S (RS,RE) aU ( RA ) aND
Right aileron Yes Yes aND
aSee symbol list for definition.
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New-Projection- Vector Design
While the new-threshold design was intended for operation in 10-ft/sec turbulence, in terms
of thresholds and gains, it was not completely designed for turbulence, in that the projection
vectors from the BL design were retained. The optimum system for use in 10-ft/sec turbulence,
in terms of the design procedure previously described, would be a system completely redesigned
by using the noise standard deviations for the turbulence truth model in table 23. Such an
aircraft-path subsystem, referred to herein as the new-projection-vector (PV10) design, was
designed and evaluated for comparison with the new TG design. Results of the design process
are shown in tables 27 to 29. It is interesting to note the projection vectors (table 27) for the
trigger and verify tests and to compare them with those in the baseline design (table 8). In the
BL design, the tests for thrust failures depended almost entirely on the yaw-rate residual (the
pr-component of the projection vector is 0.9999) and not at all on the pitch-rate residual. In
the new PV10 design, however, the thrust-failure tests depend significantly on the pitch-rate
residual. A similar change occurred in the vector for the rudder-failure tests. On the other
hand, the projection vectors for the horizontal tail failures remain unchanged. Also, while the
minimum detectable failure magnitudes ]STi for the new PV10 design are considerably larger
than for the BL system, they are smaller than those for the new TG design.
Table 27. New-Projection-Vector Design Results for Aircraft-Path Trigger Test
After Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
parameter
P:
(_'x)
(.y)
(-p)
(_,q)
(_'r)
aST
tT
Left
thrust
0.0376
0
0
0
.545
•838
.295
-9.086
3.44
Right
thrust
0.0376
0
0
0
.545
-.838
.295
-9.086
3.44
Left
horizontal
tail
0
0
0
0
-I.0
0
•193
-9.402
1.66
Right
horizontal
tail Rudder
0
0
0
0
-1.0
0
•193
-9.402
1.66
0
.0445
0
.446
0
-.894
.278
-9.138
2.77
Left
aileron
0
0
0
.749
-.662
0
.250
-9.226
6.46
Right
aileron
0
0
0
-.749
-.662
0
.250
-9.226
6.46
Table 28. New-Projection-Vector Design Results for Aircraft-Path Verify Test
After Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
parameter
GA
GD
kT
tv
Leh
thrust
0.0914 lb × 103
.0914
.00418
3
.01254
Right
thrust
0•0914 lb x 103
.0914
.00418
3
.01254
Left
horizontal
tail
0.0598 °
•0598
.00179
5
.00894
Right
horizontal
tail
0.0598 °
.0598
.00179
5
.00894
Rudder
0.0862 °
.0862
.00372
4
.01486
Left
aileron
0.0774 °
.0774
.00300
5
.01498
Right
aileron
0.0774 °
.0774
.00300
5
.01498
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Table 29. New-Projection-Vector Design Results for Aircraft-Path Isolate Test
After Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
parameter
a gti/j :
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(Ru)
(LA)
(RA)
_i/j:
(LT)
(RT)
(z_)
(RH)
(Ru)
(LA)
(RA)
ki/j:
(LT)
(1:¢T)
(ZH)
(RH)
(LA)
(RA)
tlil _:
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(Ru)
(LA)
(RA)
Left
thrust
Right
thrust
0.418
0.0648
Left
horizontal
tail
0.385
.390
0.0597
.0604
Right
horizontal
tail
0.390
.385
.394
0.0604
.0597
.0611
Rudder
0.585
.585
.293
.293
0.0907
.0907
.0453
.0453
Left
aileron
0.360
.360
.348
.348
.341
0.0558
.0558
.0539
.0539
.0529
0.194 0.179
.181
0.181
.179
.305
0.272
.272
.181
.181
0.223
.223
.270
.270
.212
Right
aileron
0.360
.360
.348
.348
.341
.295
0.0558
.0558
.0539
.0539
.0529
.0457
0.223
.223
.270
.270
.212
.228
To evaluate the false-alarm performance of the new PV10 design, three runs with the CT4
climbing-turn maneuver were made with a G --- 10 ft/sec; each run used different random
sequences for the turbulence. Results are summarized in table 30. One false alarm (false
detection) and five false triggers were experienced in the three runs, for a total of 168 sec
of aircraft-path subsystem operating time, compared with no false alarms and only two false
triggers for the new TG design under the same conditions and compared with seven false alarms
in 22.5 sec for the BL system. Thus, in terms of false-alarm performance in turbulence, the new
PV10 design was far superior to the BL design, but not quite as good as the new TG design.
It is not known why the new PV10 design exhibited slightly poorer false-alarm performance,
contrary to expectations, than the new TG design.
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Table 30. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for New-Projection-Vector
Design With 10-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer I. 15 13.30 14.30
Rudder 3.45 38.35
Right elevator 7.10 7.35 bND
Right aileron 6.55 13.05
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer aCS (RS, RE) aRA aU (LT)
Rudder Yes Yes
Right elevator aCS (RS, RE) aU (RA) aND
Right aileron Yes Yes
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Run
Random-
sequence set
Number of
triggers
3
2
0
Number of
false alarms
Isolated FDI active
surface time, a sec
bLT
56.00
56.00
56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
The performance of the new PV10 design in detecting and isolating aircraft-path failures
under turbulent conditions (a G = 10 ft/sec) was evaluated by simulating a loss of surface
effectiveness during the climbing-turn maneuver CT4, and results are shown in table 30 as
a function of the percent effectiveness of the failed surface. With the surface at 60-percent
effectiveness, all failures were detected, and at 80 percent, all failures but the elevator were
detected. This performance is somewhat better than that of the new TG design (table 25),
which failed to detect failures at 80-percent effectiveness. With respect to isolation performance,
the new PV10 design was able to correctly isolate rudder and aileron failures even at 80-percent
effectiveness, an improvement over the new TG design. However, the two designs were nearly
equal in their ability to isolate stabilizer and elevator failures in 10-ft/sec turbulence.
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Results of nine simulation runs to evaluate the performance of the new PV10 design with no
turbulence are tabulated in table 31. In this environment, failure-detection performance of the
new TG and new PV10 designs were similar; neither detected failures at 60-percent effectiveness,
and both detected three out of four failures at 40-percent effectiveness. Isolation performance
of the new PV10 design was better, in that it correctly isolated the three failures it detected at
40-percent effectiveness.
Table 31. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for New-Projection-Vector
Design With No Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
=
Right stabilizer 1.15 bND
Rudder 47.35 bND
Right elevator 1.35 ND bND
Right aileron 6.60 bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbols list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
o% 20%
aCS (RS, RE)
40%
acs (RS,RE)
Yes
aND
Yes
60%
_ND
aSee symbol list for definition.
80%
The performance of the three designs is summarized in table 32. The baseline system
performed best with no turbulence, where it detected four out of four failures at 60-percent
effectiveness; the other two designs detected none of those. In 10-ft/sec turbulence, however,
the BL system was unusable as a result of false alarms, while the other two performed well; the
new-threshold design was the best with respect to false alarms. The new TG design and the new
PV10 design both performed well in detecting and isolating failures in turbulence, but the new
PV10 design performed better. It detected three out of four failures at 80-percent effectiveness,
and the new TG design detected none out of three. The new PV10 design is sufficiently superior
to the new TG design to warrant using it as the basis for an adaptive design. In other words,
an aircraft-path subsystem design that is adaptive to varying turbulence levels should include
adaptive projection vectors as well as adaptive thresholds and gains.
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Table 32. Summary of Performance of Baseline, New-Threshold, and
New-Projection-Vector Designs
(a) Detection and isolation of failures with no turbulence
Number of failures/number detected/number correctly isolated a
as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Design 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Baseline 4/4/3 4/1/0
New TG 4/4/4 4/4/4 4/3/1 3/0/0
New PV10 1/1/1 4/3/3 4/0/0
aFor stabilizer and elevator failures, isolated to horizontal tail (confusion set containing only stabilizer and
elevator).
(b) Detection and isolation of failures with 10-ft/sec turbulence
Number of failures/number detected/number correctly isolated a
as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Design 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Baseline
New TG
New PV10
3/3/3
2/2/2
4/3/1
4/4/2
3/0/0
4/3/2
aFor stabilizer and elevator failures, isolated to horizontal tail (confusion set containing only stabilizer and
elevator).
(c) False-alarm performance (no failures) with 10-ft/sec turbulence
Number of
Design false triggers
Baseline 11
New TG 2
New PV10 5
Number of false alarms FDIactive
(false detections) time, a see
7 22.5
0 168.0
1 168.0
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational.
Adaptive Type Designs
Interpolated Design
Superior FDI performance is achieved when different projection vectors, gains, and thresholds
are used in zero turbulence and in 10-ft/sec turbulence. In particular, the baseline (BL) design
was superior at zero turbulence, and the new-projection-vector (PV10) design was superior at
10-ft/sec turbulence. In an operational FDI system, some technique must be incorporated into
the system to switch between these two designs as the level of turbulence changes. For improved
performance in other levels of turbulence, it seems logical that a smooth transition between the
two designs as a function of the turbulence level would be preferred over an abrupt transition,
or switch. Algorithms were implemented in the software to linearly interpolate between the
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BL design values in zero turbulence and the new PV10 design values at 10-ft/sec turbulence
for each of the trigger thresholds tTi , the trigger and verify projection vectors Pi, the verify
thresholds tvi , the isolate thresholds tli/j, and the isolate projection vectors Pi/j" Interpolation
was performed as a function of the variable TURB, which represents the system's knowledge of
the standard deviation of the turbulence, or gusts a G. In fact, the algorithms also extrapolated
to levels higher than the 10-ft/sec level of the new PV10 design. After interpolation, the new
trigger and isolate projection vectors were renormalized to unit length. The FDI system software
did not use separate variables for the verify projection vectors and the verify gains, but combined
them into one set of vectors P( where
!
Pi -- GAiPi (107)
The algorithms interpolated the vectors P[, and these were then used without normalization.
To perform the interpolation, the level of the turbulence a G must be known or estimated,
and the limiting performance of the system would be when a G is known exactly. To evaluate this
limiting performance, the algorithms in this design used the true value of turbulence by setting
TURB = a G in the interpolation computations, and the system was called the interpolated
design. Note that a G is the value specified for the simulation run, not the sample standard
deviation of the actual sample sequence produced by the random-number generator.
To evaluate the false-alarm performance of the interpolated design at an intermediate
turbulence level, three simulation runs were made while executing the CT4 climbing-turn
maneuver in 5-ft/sec turbulence (TURB = a G = 5) with no failures. For comparison, similar
runs were made with the BL and new PV10 designs. Results are summarized in table 33.
Under these conditions, the BL design experienced 6 false alarms and 40 false triggers in 168 sec
of operation. On the other hand, both the interpolated design and the new PV10 design
experienced no false alarms and no false triggers in identical runs.
The performance of the interpolated design in detecting and isolating aircraft-path failures in
5-ft/sec turbulence was evaluated by simulating loss of surface effectiveness during the climbing-
turn maneuver CT4; for comparison, similar runs were made with the new PV10 design. Results
are shown as a function of the percent effectiveness of the failed surface for the new PV10
design in table 34 and for the interpolated design in table 35. With the surface at 60-percent
effectiveness, all failures were detected by the interpolated design; however, only the rudder
failure was detected by the new PV10 design. Furthermore, the interpolated design correctly
isolated three of the four failures. At 80-percent effectiveness, the interpolated design detected
and isolated the rudder failure, but not the stabilizer, elevator, and aileron failures. Thus, in
5-ft/sec turbulence the performance of the interpolated design was superior to that of the new
PV10 design.
To assess false-alarm performance of the interpolated design in turbulence greater than the
upper (PV10) design level of 10 ft/sec, three additional simulation runs with no failures were
made in 15-ft/sec turbulence. The TURB was set equal to 15, so that the thresholds and
projection vectors were extrapolated beyond the PV10 design level. Results of the runs with
this extrapolated design are summarized in table 36. Nine false triggers and six false alarms
were experienced in less than 82 sec. Thus, it appears that adjustment of the thresholds and
projection vectors by linear extrapolation beyond the upper design level is not acceptable.
To obtain acceptable aircraft-path subsystem performance in turbulence significantly greater
than 10 if/see, it appears that additional design points at higher turbulence levels must be
obtained. Thresholds and projection vectors can then be calculated by interpolation between
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Table 33. False-Alarm Performance Summary With 5-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Baseline design
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 11 3 bRT 56.00
2 2 12 1 bRT 56.00
3 3 17 2 bRT,bRu 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) New-projection-vector (PV10) design
Run
Random-
sequence set .
Number of
triggers
Number of
false alarms
Isolated FDI active
surface time, a sea
56.00
56.00
56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
(C) Interpolated design (TURB = 5 ft/sec)
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 0 0 56.00
2 2 0 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table 34. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for New-Projection-Vector
Design With 5-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
1.15
6.85
6.40
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
bND
34.45
bND
bND
bND
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer aCS ( RS, RE) aND
Rudder Yes aND
Right elevator aCS (RS, RE) aND
Right aileron Yes aND
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 0 0 56.00
2 2 0 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table 35. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Interpolated Design
With 5-if/see Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer 1.15 bND
Rudder 3.60 48.55
Right elevator 6.50 7.25 bND
Right aileron 6.45 bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
o%
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
20% 40%
aCS (RS, RE)
6o%
_CS (RS, RE)
Yes
aU (RA)
Yes
80%
aND
Yes
aND
aND
"See symbol list for definition.
Random-
Run sequence set
1 1
2 2
3 3
(c) False-alarm performance
Number of
triggers
Number of
false alarms
Isolated FDI active
surface time, a sec
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
56.00
56.00
56.00
Table 36. False-Alarm Performance of Extrapolated Design With 15-ft/sec Turbulence
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 2 2 bU, bRA 14.20
2 2 2 2 bU,bRS, bRE 12.50
3 3 5 2 bU, bRA 55.00
i
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
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the appropriatedesignpoints.To this end,additionalno-failuresimulationrunsweremadein
20-ft/secturbulence,and the residualswereprocessedto obtainnewvaluesfor the diagonals
of the white-noiseand low-pass-noisecovariancematrices,JEwand Eg, respectively.These
newvalueswereinput into the FDI designprogramto createanothernew-projection-vector
design.Whenthis designwasevaluatedin 20-ft/secturbulence,six falsetriggersandfour false
alarmswereexperiencedin 57.35secof operationduring threesimulationruns. To improve
this performance,the trigger,verify, and isolatethresholdswereincreasedby a factorof 1.5.
With thesenewthresholds,no falsealarmswereencounteredin threeno-failuresimulationruns
in 20-ft/secturbulence.The aircraft-pathsubsystemwasthen testedin 15-ft/secturbulence.
Thresholdsandprojectionvectorswereobtainedbylinearlyinterpolating(TURB = 15)between
this latest designand the PV10design.Onefalsealarmwasexperiencedin eachof threeno-
failuresimulationruns,againanunacceptablelevelof performance.
Toimprovesystemperformancein thehigherturbulencelevels,thenoisecovariancematrices
Ew and Et for 20-ft/secturbulencewereincreasedby a factorof 1.5,and thesenewvalues
(shownin table 37)wereusedto createa new aircraft-pathsubsystemdesign(PV20). This
procedurecreatednewprojectionvectors,gains,andthresholdsratherthanjust increasingthe
thresholds,and the resultingdesignvaluesaresummarizedin tables38 to 40. Nearlyall the
thresholdstT,, t_, and tii/j increased relative to the PV10 design shown in tables 27 to 29, and
some of the minimum detectable failure levels fsTi and si/j increased dramatically because of
the higher noise levels.
Table 37. Errors for Aircraft-Path Truth Model With PV20 Design
Residual
x-acceleration, _x
y-acceleration, vy
z-acceleration, vz
P-acceleration, vp
Q-acceleration, VQ
R-acceleration, v/¢
Standard
deviation of
white noise,
ao- w
0.599 ft/sec 2
.639 ft/sec 2
2.64 ft/sec 2
.0599 rad/sec 2
.0388 rad/sec 2
.0236 rad/sec 2
Low-frequency
noise cutoff,
rad/sec
2.0
Standard
deviation of
low-frequency
noise, ba t
1.31 ft/sec 2
.768 ft/sec 2
5.33 ft/sec 2
.102 rad/sec 2
.0442 rad/sec 2
.030 rad/sec 2
HPF
cutoff
frequency,
rad/sec
0.5
Standard
deviation of
total noise,
ca/(20)
16.5 ft/sec _
9.92 ft/sec 2
67.3 ft/sec 2
1.29 rad/sec _
.573 rad/sec 2
.386 rad/sec 2
aSquare root
bSquare root
CSquare root
of diagonal terms of Ew.
of diagonal terms of Et.
of diagonal terms of E/,
The PV20 design was tested in 20-ft/sec turbulence to evaluate false-alarm performance,
and the results are shown in table 41. In three simulation runs with different random-number
seeds, two false triggers and no false alarms were experienced in 168 sec of operation. When
operated in 15-ft/sec turbulence (a G = TURB = 15), the system parameters were interpolated
between the PV10 and PV20 values. For three no-failure runs, the results shown in table 42
were six false triggers and one false alarm in 131 sec of operation. While some improvement
in false-alarm performance at the higher turbulence levels would be required for an operational
system, it was decided to continue with the evaluation of the failure-detection performance of
this design.
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Table38. PV20DesignResultsfor Aircraft-PathTriggerTestAfter
Projection-VectorOptimization
Design Left
parameter thrust
P:
(uz) 0.0151
(_y) o
(_,z) ]
(ur) .9999
(TST .459
t T -8.577
fsl. 8.11
Right
thrust
0.0151
0
1
-.9999
.459
-8.577
8.11
Left
horizontal
tail
-1.0
0
.573
-8.224
4.93
Right
horizontal
tail Rudder
0
-1.0
0
.573
0
.0176
0
0
0
-.9998
.423
Left
aileron
0
0
0
.439
-.899
0
.767
-7.623
25.21
Right
aileron
0
0
0
-.439
-.899
0
.767
-7.623
25.21
Table 39. PV20 Design Results for Aircraft-Path Verify Test After
Projection-Vector Optimization
Design
parameter
GA
GO
kT
tv
Left
thrust
0.142 lb x 103
.142
.0101
2
.0203
Right
thrust
0.142 lb × 103
.142
.0101
2
.0203
Left Right
horizontal horizontal
tail t_l
0.178 ° 0.178 °
.178 .178
.0158 .0158
• 2 2
.0315 .0315
Rudder
0.131 °
.i31
.00862
2
.0172
Left
aileron
0.238 °
.238
.0282
2
.0565
Right
aileron
0.238 °
.238
.0282
2
.0565
The performance of the interpolated design in detecting and isolating failures in higher
turbulence was evaluated by simulating loss of surface effectiveness. The results for turbulence
levels of 20 ft/sec and 15 ;_/sec are tabulated in tables 41 and 42, respectively. With TURB :
a G = 20, no failures were detected at 60-percent effectiveness, and only the rudder and aileron
failures were detected at 40 percent. At {3- and 20-percent effectiveness, all stabilizer, elevator,
and rudder failures were detected; stabilizer and rudder detection occurred in less than 3 sec.
The stabilizer and rudder failures were not isolated, but rather were undetermined failures.
However, the resulting confusion set correctly contained the right stabilizer and elevator in the
case of the stabilizer failure, and contained only the rudder in the case of the rudder failure. In
the latter case, an undetermined failure was declared repeatedly during the run. Nevertheless,
the fact that an isolation decision was not made in these cases indicates that perhaps the
isolation thresholds are too high or that the isolation projection vectors need modification. The
right-elevator failures, on the other hand, were isolated incorrectly to the right aileron. This
performance was not nearly as good as the system performance in 10-ft/sec turbulence, where
detection and isolation generally occurred with less severe failures.
With TURB = a G = 15 (table 42), stabilizer and elevator failures were detected at 40-percent
surface effectiveness, aileron failures at 60 percent, and rudder failures at 80 percent. This
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Table40. PV20DesignResultsfor Aircraft-PathIsolateTestAfter
Projection-VectorOptimization
Design
parameter
asti/j:
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(nu)
(LA)
(hA)
8i/j :
(LT)
(RT)
(LH)
(RH)
(Ru)
(LA)
(RA)
ki/j:
(LT)
(RT)
(nil)
(RH)
(n_)
(LA)
(RA)
t li/j :
(LT)
(nT)
(LH)
(RH)
(R_)
(LA)
(RA)
Left
thrust
Right
thrust
1.007
0.156
Left
horizontal
tail
0.546
.546
0.0846
.0846
Right
horizontal
tail
0.546
.546
1.757
0.0846
.O846
.272
Rudder
1.96
1.96
.691
.691
0.304
.304
.107
.107
Left
aileron
0.830
.857
1.435
1.435
.833
0.129
.133
.222
.222
.129
0.312 0.169
.169
0.169
.169
.545
0.608
.608
.214
.214
0.257
.266
.445
.445
.258
Right
aileron
0.857
.830
1.435
1.435
.833
1.014
0.133
.129
.222
.222
.129
.157
0.266
.257
.445
.445
.258
.315
performance is significantly better than at a G = 20 ft/sec, but not as good as at a G = 10 ft/sec.
In this case, the rudder and aileron failures were correctly isolated, and the stabilizer and elevator
failures were isolated to the proper confusion set.
The trigger and verify statistics and thresholds for each surface for a right-aileron failure are
plotted in figures A11 and A12 for 20-ft/sec and 15-ft/sec turbulence, respectively. The statistics
for the right aileron are repeated in figure 17. The thresholds in figure All are the values for
the PV20 design. The thresholds in figure A12 are the values obtained by interpolating midway
(TURB = 15) between the PV10 and PV20 designs and, of course, are lower (more negative)
than those in figure All for TURB = 20. The verification/isolation process is initiated by a
right-thrust trigger at 17.55 sec into the run. (See fig. All.) All the right-aileron isolation tests
passed in favor of the right aileron by 18.10 sec (not shown in fig. All), but a failure/isolation
is not declared until the right aileron verifies at 18.55 sec. No other verify tests passed.
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Table 41. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Interpolated Design
With 20-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80_
Right stabilizer 2.25 2.65 bND bND
Rudder 1.65 1.85 2.40
Right elevator 14.40 14.45 bND
Right aileron 14.30
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
aU (RS, RE)
"V (Ru)
aRA
aU (RS, RE)
°u (R_,)
aRA
40% 60%
aND aND
ou (nu)
aND
Yes -.
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
2 2 0 0 56.00
3 3 1 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table 42. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Interpolated Design
With 15-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
O% 20% 40%
7.70
38.55
60%
bND
4.10
bND
8.45
80%
13.20
bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer aCS (RS, RE) aND
Rudder Yes Yes
Right elevator aCS (RS, RE) aND
Right aileron Yes aND
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 3 0 56.00
2 2 1 1 bRS, RE 16.60
3 3 2 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
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Figure 17. Aircraft-path right-aileron trigger and verify statistics for right-aileron partially missing surface failure
(40-percent effectiveness). Interpolated design.
The degradation in the performance of the aircraft-path subsystem in turbulence above
10 ft/sec, particularly the occurrence of false alarms that necessitated the increasing of the
noise covariances above the measured values, indicates that some improvements in the design
process are required. Perhaps some refinement of the design and truth models is necessary.
The noise variances a2w and a 2 for the truth model in 20-ft/sec turbulence are far greater than
those assumed for the baseline design (ref. 25), as can be seen by comparing the values in
table 37 with those in table 6. Nevertheless, the process of linearly interpolating the projection
vectors, gains, and thresholds worked well, as evidenced by the failure-detection and isolation
performance in 15-ft/sec turbulence, where performance exceeded that at 20 ft/sec, and by
the very good failure-detection/isolation performance and excellent false-alarm performance at
5-ft/sec turbulence.
Actuator-Path Subsystem
Because the aircraft-path subsystem is considerably more complex than the actuator-path
subsystem, the emphasis when evaluating performance in turbulence has been placed on the
aircraft path. However, turbulence did have some effect on the actuator-path subsystem.
Table 43 summarizes the false-alarm performance of the actuator path during the three no-
failure climbing-turn simulation runs in 20-ft/sec turbulence. There were a total of 29 false
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triggersand 5 falsealarms(falseverifiesor detections)in 168secof operation. Of the false
alarms,two wererudder, two wereright aileron,and onewas left aileron. Obviously,this
performanceis unacceptable,and someredesignof the actuator-pathsubsystemis required.
Onefacetof the designthat shouldbeexaminedis the determinationof variancesof the noise,
or error, termsin the truth model.An adaptivesystemthat adjuststhresholdsasa functionof
theturbulencelevelmaybenecessary.Furtherwork in this areahasnot beenpursued,however,
becauseit is believedthat if anadaptiveaircraft-pathsubsystemcanbesuccessfullydeveloped,
similar techniquescaneasilybeappliedto theactuatorpath.
Table43. Actuator-PathSubsystemFalse-AlarmPerformanceWith 20-ft/secTurbulence
Run
l_ndom-
sequence set Maneuver
Number of
triggers
CT4 16
CT4 5
CT4 8
False
alarms
aLA, b RA
bRu
bRu,b RA
FDI active
time, a sec
56.00
56.00
56.00
aTime actuator-path subsystem is operational.
bSee symbol list for definition.
Adaptive Design
As shown previously, improved aircraft-path subsystem performance in turbulence could
be obtained by using the interpolated design that adjusts the gains, projection vectors, and
thresholds as functions of the turbulence level TURB. In the interpolated design, the value of
TURB is provided to the system a priori by setting it equal to aG, the standard deviation of the
turbulence specified for the simulation run and input to the simulation for use by the random-
number generator. In an operational system, this value is not known and must be determined in
real time. Thus, the first step in evolving the interpolated design into a self-contained adaptive
FDI system was the development of a turbulence estimator.
Turbulence estimator. Several different techniques were considered for obtaining an estimate
of the standard deviation of the turbulence 5(7, or wind gusts. Among those techniques
briefly evaluated in simulation were averaging the squared, filtered output of the body-mounted
accelerators and averaging the squared, filtered outputs of the angle-of-attack and angle-of-
sideslip sensors. These methods proved inferior to a technique developed by Deckert et al.
(ref. 34) for use in the NASA F-8 digital fly-by-wire program. This technique is discussed in
more detail herein.
Consider the acceleration a of the aircraft at the center of gravity:
a=V+wxV-g (108a)
or
"V=a-w×V+g (108b)
where the variables are inertial quantities in body axes. A discrete time approximation to
equation (108b) is given in predictor-corrector form by equations (109) to (111) as follows:
VP(k) = _'(k- 1) + [a*(k) + g*(k) -wm(k ) x V*(k)] AT (109)
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where VP(k) is the predicted velocity at sample k, V(k - 1) is the estimated velocity at sample
k - 1, and AT is the sample interval. The starred quantities are defined subsequently. Define
a residual _(k) as
¢(k) = v (k) - vp(k)
and let the estimated velocity V(k) be computed from
9(k) = vp(k) + aE¢(k)
(110)
(111)
To improve the accuracy of the integration of acceleration in equation (109), the measured
accelerations, attitude rates, and velocities are averaged over the k and k- 1 samples. Thus,
the starred variables are defined as
1
a_n(k) = 5 Jam(k) + am(k - 1)] (l12a)
1
¢om(k ) = _ [wm(k) + Oom(k - 1)1 (l12b)
1
Vm(k ) = _ [Vm(k) + Vm(k - 1)] (112c)
1
g*(k) = _ [g(k) + g(k - 1)] (112d)
where
[ACn,(k) -
am(k) = [ACy(k)
LAC (k)
[ Pm (k)
win(k) = IOta(k)
LRm (k)
outputs of body-mounted )accelerometers after compensationfor off-center-of-gravity effects
( attitude-rate gyro outputs )
(llaa)
(llab)
[ cosZm(k) cosam(k) ]
Vm (k) = / sin/3m (k ) _ VTm (k) ( measured airspeeds ) (113c )
[_cos/3m (k) sin am (k) J
[ -sinOm(k) ]
g(k) = ]cosOm(k)sin_m(k)I g (113d)
kcos Om(k) cos q_m (k) J
The acceleration in equation (109) is inertial, but the velocity Vm is relative to the air.
Therefore,
Vm(k) = V(k) - Vw(k) + e(k) (114)
where V(k) is inertial aircraft velocity, Vw (k) is wind velocity, and e(k) is measurement error.
If the measurements are perfect, the aircraft acceleration is constant or linearly changing, the
gain G E is small, and the wind velocity Vw(k) has zero mean and varies rapidly compared
with the estimator response, then the estimated velocity _'(k) tends toward the inertial velocity
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V(k), andtheresiduals_(k) approachthewindvelocityVw(k). Theresidualscanthenbeused
to estimatethe levelof the windgusts,or turbulence.
Eachchannel(U, V, W, or x, y, z) of equations (109) to (111) should be included in a
turbulence estimator, one channel of which is shown in figure 18. The residuals are high-pass
filtered, to remove bias terms, and then squared. The squared output is then averaged in a
low-pass filter to form an estimate of the variance of the turbulence in that channel. During
the simulation evaluation, it was found that sensor noise in the residuals produced a significant
nonzero value for the estimate when the actual turbulence was set to zero. To reduce this effect,
a low-pass filter was implemented in the estimator preceding the high-pass filter.
[co m x
,
V p + t;
B ..L
4-
Figure 18. One channel of turbulence level estimator.
The estimator was evaluated by using the 737 nonlinear simulation over specified turbulence
levels a G of 0 to 20 ft/sec. At o G -- 10 ft/sec, three simulation runs were made during straight
and level flight, with a different sample sequence from the random-number generator for each
run. These three runs were repeated while executing the CT4 climbing-turn maneuver. Similar
runs were made with a G = 20 ft/sec.
Results are shown in figure 19 for each of the three channels of the estimator. The horizontal
axis is the sample standard deviation of the turbulence a T for the 60-sec run computed as the
rms of the sample standard deviations of the simulated gusts aU, av, and aW; that is,
O'T: [_(a_z+o'2+er2)] 1/2 (115)
The vertical axis is the mean value over the 60-sec run of the estimate 5U, 5V, or 5"W.
The average error in these estimates was -0.57, -0.98, and 1.1 ft/sec for aU, &V, and &W,
respectively. Simulation results showed that the accuracy of the estimator could be improved
if the outputs of the three channels were combined in an rms fashion to form an estimate ST,
as shown in the final design (fig. 20). Mean values of 5T are also plotted in figure 19, and
these estimates are more accurate. A time-history plot of the estimate &T is shown in figure 21,
together with a plot of the sample standard deviation (rms of the three components) of the most
recent 100 samples (5 sec) of the simulated turbulence for a run where a G -- 10 ft/sec. Although
the estimate certainly does not track the sample standard deviation exactly, it is anticipated
that the estimator will be sufficiently accurate to use in an adaptive FDI system. Parameter
values for the final estimator design are listed in table 44.
81
Estimated
turbulence,
ft/sec
5O
40
3O
2O
10
0
0
o ÷
, I • I i I I , | l
10 20 30 40 50
Sample standard deviation, ft/sec
Figure 19. Results for turbulence level estimator.
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Figure 20. Turbulence level estimator final design.
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Figure 21. Time history of turbulence level estimator output.
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Table 44. Parameter Values for Final Design of Turbulence Level Estimator
Parameter Variable Value
Estimator feedback gain
Low-pass noise filter time constant, sec
High-pass-filter time constant, sec
Low-pass averaging filter time constant, sec
U-channel gain
V-channel gain
W-channel gain
Output gain
C_
TNLP
THp
TLp
Gu
Gv
Gw
GT
0.010
.200
5.000
5.000
2.110
1.650
1.400
1.045
Design description. In the interpolated design previously discussed, the thresholds and
projection vectors were determined by linear interpolation between two end points according
to the independent variable TURB. Two sets of end points were used: the BL and the PV10
design values for TURB between 0 and 10, or the PV10 and the PV20 design values for TURB
between 10 and 20, as selected before the simulation run. The value of TURB was set equal
to the value of a G specified for the run; thus, the interpolated thresholds, gains, and vectors
stayed constant throughout a run.
For the adaptive design, the turbulence estimator was implemented in the FDI software. At
each sample interval, an estimate of the level of turbulence 5 T was computed, and TURB was
set equal to this value before the aircraft-path subsystem computations were performed. The
range of the independent variable TURB was divided into two regions, and linear interpolation
was performed as shown in figure 22. For TURBL < TURB < TURBM, the dependent
variables were interpolated between YL and YM, corresponding to the BL and PV10 design
values, respectively. For TURB > TURBM, the dependent variables were interpolated between
(or extrapolated above) YM and YH, corresponding to the PV10 and PV20 design values,
respectively. Values of 0, 10, and 20 for TURBL, TURBM, and TURBH, as used in the
interpolated design, were inappropriate for the adaptive design; these values were those specified
for the turbulence standard deviation for a simulation run, but were not the actual sample
standard deviations, which were generally larger. The turbulence estimator attempts to estimate
the sample standard deviation of approximately the latest 5 sec of turbulence. Thus, nominal
values of the sample standard deviation, not the specified aG, should be used. Values of 0, 17,
and 34 were selected for TURBL, TURBM, and TURBH, respectively.
Interpolated
variable, Y
YH
YM
YL
I I I
TURBL TURBM TURBH
Independent variable, TURB
Figure 22. Linear interpolation scheme for adaptive design.
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Simulation results. To evaluate the detection and isolation performance of the adaptive
design in a turbulence environment, simulation runs were made at specified turbulence levels
a G of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 ft/sec with aircraft-path failures simulating partial effectiveness of
each of the four surfaces: right stabilizer, rudder, right elevator, and right aileron. To evaluate
false-alarm performance, three no-failure runs with different sample sequences for the turbulence
were made at each of the same turbulence levels except zero, where only one run was made. As
in previous runs, the failures occurred at t = 5 sec, and the climbing-turn maneuver CT4 was
initiated at t = 10 sec.
Results for the no-turbulence runs are tabulated in table 45. All four failures at 60-percent
effectiveness were successfully detected, and the stabilizer and aileron failures were correctly
isolated (the stabilizer to the right horizontal tail). The rudder and elevator failures at this
failure level were isolated incorrectly. Failures at 80-percent effectiveness were not detected,
but the two failures (rudder and elevator) at 40 percent were detected successfully and isolated
correctly. Comparison with similar runs for the baseline design in table 13 shows that the BL
design detected the rudder and aileron failures more quickly at 60-percent effectiveness, and
the BL design detected one of four failures at 80-percent effectiveness. The BL design correctly
isolated the rudder failure at 60-percent effectiveness. During the no-failure run, the adaptive
design experienced no failures and only one false alarm, as did the baseline design. Thus, the
adaptive design performed well in zero turbulence, although the baseline design was slightly
better.
Results for 5-ft/sec turbulence are shown in table 46. At 60-percent effectiveness, the
stabilizer, rudder, and elevator failures were detected, and the stabilizer and rudder failures
were correctly isolated by the adaptive design. Failures at 80 percent were not detected, but at
40 percent the two failures were detected and isolated correctly. In three no-failure runs totaling
168 sec of operation, no false alarms and no false triggers were experienced. This is the same
as the no-failure performance of the interpolated design shown in table 33.
Results for the adaptive design in 10-ft/sec turbulence are shown in table 47. All the failures
at 40- and 60-percent effectiveness and two of the four at 80 percent were successfully detected.
At 60 percent, the stabilizer and elevator failures resulted in undetermined failure declarations
and were not isolated. The rudder failure was correctly isolated, even at 80-percent effectiveness.
There were no false alarms and only two false triggers during three no-failure runs. Comparing
the detection performance of the adaptive design with that of the PV10 design in table 30
shows that the adaptive design detected all the failures that were detected by the PV10 design,
except the right stabilizer failure at 80-percent effectiveness; the adaptive design detected two
of the failures significantly quicker. Isolation performance of the two designs was nearly equal.
False-alarm performance of the adaptive design was superior to that of the PV10 design and
vastly superior to that of the BL design in table 15.
As can be seen in table 48, in 15-ft/sec turbulence the adaptive system detected and isolated
three out of three aircraft-path failures at 40-percent effectiveness, detected four of four and
isolated two at 60 percent, but detected none at 80-percent effectiveness. In three no-failure
runs, the system experienced two false triggers and one false alarm of the right horizontal tail in
128.6 sec of operation. This result is slightly better than the interpolated design (see table 42),
which missed two detections at 60-percent effectiveness and experienced the same false alarm
and five false triggers under the same conditions.
Table 49 contains results for the adaptive design for a G = 20 ft/sec. Again, the system
detected all the failures at 60-percent effectiveness (and correctly isolated three of the four) and
no failures at 80-percent effectiveness. No false alarms and only one false trigger occurred during
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Table 45. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Adaptive Design
With No Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer 1.15 bND
Rudder 1.85 8.90
Right elevator 1.20 6.70
Right aileron 22.20 -,
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure, bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Yes
aCS (RS, RE)
aCS (RS, RE)
aRT
aRA
Yes
aSee symbol list for definition.
aND
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table 46. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Adaptive Design
With 5-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure_detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer 1.50 bND
Rudder 24.05 bND
Right elevator 1.50 7.25 bND
Right aileron 6.30 bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80_
Right stabilizer aCS ( RS, RE) aND
Rudder Yes aND
Right elevator '_CS (RS,RE) aU (RA) aND
Right aileron Yes ND
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface timej a sec
1 1 0 0 56.00
2 2 0 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table47. Failure-DetectionandIsolationPerformancefor AdaptiveDesign
With 10-ft/secTurbulence
(a) Detectionperformance
Failure-detectiontimea as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer 1.00 1.75 bND
Rudder 3.55 40.20
Right elevator 1.50 7.35 bND
Right aileron 6.75 13.90
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer aC S (RS, RE) au (LS, RS, LE, RE) aND
Rudder Yes Yes
Right elevator aCS (RS, RE) au (RA) aND
Right aileron Yes aU (LT)
_See symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Run
Random- Number of
sequence set triggers
1 1
2 1
3 0
Number of
false alarms
Isolated
surface
FDI active
time, a sec
56.00
56.00
56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table 48. Failure-Detection and Isolation Performance for Adaptive Design
With 15-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failure-detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 2070 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
1.15
1.40
1.55
2.20
1.85
38.70
39.70
bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 070 2070 4070 60% 8070
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
aCS (RS, RE)
aCS (RS, RE)
Yes
aCS (LS, LE)
Yes
aCS (RS, RE)
aU (LA, RA)
aND
aSee symbol list for definition.
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
2 2 1 1 bRS, bRE 16.60
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
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Table49. Failure-DetectionandIsolationPerformancefor AdaptiveDesign
With 20-ft/sec Turbulence
(a) Detection performance
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
Faitur_detection time a as a function of percent surface effectiveness
o% 20% 40%
1.15
60%
2.40
1.25
1.60
1.60
80%
bND
aTime of failure declaration relative to time of failure.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(b) Isolation performance
Failure isolation as a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
aCS (RS, RE)
_CS (RS, RE)
Yes
aRA
Yes
aSee symbol list for definition.
aND
(c) False-alarm performance
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 i l 0 56.00
2 2 0 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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the no-failureruns.Thisperformanceisconsiderablysuperiorto that of the interpolateddesign
(table41),whichmissedfour out of fourdetectionsat 60-percenteffectivenessandtwo out of
fourat 40percentin 20-ft/secturbulence.Timehistoriesof thetriggerandverifystatisticsand
thresholdsfor oneof the no-failurerunsareplotted in figure23. Contrary to previous time-
history plots, the thresholds in this case are not constant but vary as a function of the estimate
of the turbulence level plotted in figure 23. Note the false trigger in the left-horizontal-tail
channel at t _ 6 sec. The verify tests for the left thrust, right thrust, left horizontal tail, right
horizontal tail, and left aileron all fail (verify no failure) within 1 sec. The rudder and right
aileron exceed the time limit at the end of 1 sec without making a decision. At that time, a
false trigger is declared, and the aircraft-path subsystem resets and continues to operate. Thus,
no false alarm occurred.
Performance of the adaptive design is summarized in tables 50 and 51. In 688 sec of
operation in turbulence from 0 to 20 ft/sec, the system experienced one false alarm and six
false triggers. All partially missing surface failures at 40-percent effectiveness were detected and
correctly isolated. At 60-percent effectiveness, 19 out of 20 were detected, and of these 11 were
correctly isolated. When the surfaces failed at 80-percent effectiveness, the system performance
degraded severely, as only 2 out of 19 failures were detected. The adaptive system performed
well in turbulence levels where the baseline was completely unusable because of false alarms.
Furthermore, previous simulation experience (ref. 26) has shown that this airplane and flight
control system design are very robust to control-surface failures, and many smaller failures, such
as those at 80-percent effectiveness, produce effects that are hardly noticeable (thus, difficult to
detect), let alone catastrophic. Therefore, missed detections at this level do not necessarily make
the FDI system unusable. Also, it should be kept in mind that the turbulence levels referred to
in the discussion were the specified levels, and the actual wind-gust sample sequences in most
cases exhibited a sample standard deviation larger than the specified value.
Summary of Results
A procedure for designing a decentralized failure-detection and identification (FDI) system
to detect and isolate control-element failures in aircraft control systems has been developed
by Weiss and Hsu (NASA CR-178213). Using this procedure, Weiss designed a baseline FDI
system, consisting of an actuator-path subsystem and an aircraft-path subsystem, for a modified
Boeing 737 airplane. In the current report, this design was evaluated in detail by using a six-
degree-of-freedom simulation of the airplane, including atmospheric turbulence based on the
Dryden model. The design procedure was extended to improve performance of the system in
turbulence. This extension resulted in the development of an adaptive FDI system, which was
also evaluated in detail.
Evaluation of the baseline design showed that when operated in a no-turbulence environment,
the actuator-path subsystem performed very well. All actuator-path failures--stuck at neutral,
stuck at current position, and hardover--were detected in a timely manner; in the no-failure
simulation runs, there were no actuator-path false alarms. The aircraft-path subsystem also
performed well in zero turbulence. There were no false alarms, and partially missing surface
failures of the stabilizer, rudder, elevator, and aileron were all detected when the remaining
surface effectiveness was 60 percent. The right-stabilizer failure was isolated to the fictitious
right horizontal tail, since the system cannot distinguish between stabilizer and elevator failures
because of their identical effects.
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Figure 23. Aircraft-path trigger and verify statistics and turbulence level estimate. Adaptive design; no failure;
20-ft/sec turbulence.
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Figure 23. Continued.
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Figure 23. Concluded.
Table50. False-AlarmPerformanceof AdaptiveDesign
(a) No turbulence
Random- Numberof Numberof Isolated FDIactive
Run sequenceset triggers falsealarms surface time,a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
(b) 5-ft/sec turbulence
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 0
2 0
3 0
0
0
0
56.00
56.00
56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
(c) 10-ft/sec turbulence
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
2 2 1 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table50. Concluded.
(d) 15-ft/secturbulence
Run
Random-
sequenceset
Numberof
triggers
Number of
false alarms
Isolated
surface
bRS, bRE
FDI active
time, a sec
56.00
16.60
56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
bSee symbol list for definition.
(e) 20-ft/sec turbulence
Random- Number of Number of Isolated FDI active
Run sequence set triggers false alarms surface time, a sec
1 1 1 0 56.00
2 2 0 0 56.00
3 3 0 0 56.00
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
(f) Summary
Number of Number of FDI active
triggers false alarms time, a sec
6 1 688.60
aTime aircraft-path subsystem is operational before being inhibited by a failure isolation.
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Table 51. Summary of Detection and Isolation Performance of Adaptive Design
(a) Detection performance
Number of failures/number detected as
a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
All
2/2
1/1
5/5
2/2
lO/lO
5/5
5/5
5/5
5/4
20/19
5/0
5/1
5/O
4/1
19/2
(b) Isolation performance
Number of failures detected/number isolated a as
a function of percent surface effectiveness
Failed surface
Right stabilizer
Rudder
Right elevator
Right aileron
All
o% 20% 40%
2/2
1/1
5/5
2/2
10/10
60% 80%
5/3 0/0
2/4 1/1
_/1 o/o
4/3 1/0
19/11 2/1
aFor stabilizer and elevator failures, isolated to horizontal tail (confusion set containing only stabilizer and
elevator).
When the actuator-path subsystem was evaluated with model errors in the range of 5 to
15 percent, stuck-at-current-position failures were reliably detected without false alarms. With
larger model errors (12.5 to 37.5 percent), the same failures were still detected, but some false
alarms were experienced. When the aircraft-path subsystem was operated at trim points in the
vicinity of the design point, aircraft-path failures were reliably detected with no false alarms,
but isolation performance was slightly degraded. At a trim point farther away (cruise instead of
terminal area), the system was unusable because of false alarms. When moderate random errors
were added to the aircraft-path model, the system was still able to detect failures at 60-percent
effectiveness, although two false alarms occurred.
In 10-ft/sec turbulence, the actuator-path subsystem continued to perform well. Again, all
actuator-path failures were detected with no false alarms. On the other hand, the baseline
aircraft-path subsystem was completely unusable in lO-ft/sec and higher turbulence because of
the large number of false alarms. This result, plus examination of the residuals, indicated that
many of the baseline values used in the truth model for the standard deviations of the errors
in the residuals were too small. New values for the truth model in 10-ft/sec turbulence were
obtained, and two new aircraft-path subsystem designs were produced. One of these, called
new-threshold (TG) design, retained the old projection vectors but computed new gains and
thresholds. The other, called new-projection-vector (PV10) design, was a totally new design.
Both of these new designs performed well in 10-ft/sec turbulence and were far superior to the
baseline design in false-alarm performance. There was a small edge in performance to the new-
projection-vector design. However, performance of the new designs in zero turbulence was not
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nearlyasgoodasthat of thebaselinedesign,whichindicatedthat sometypeof adaptivedesign
wasnecessaryfor operationin atmosphericturbulenceandthat theadaptiveprocessprobably
shouldincludeadaptationof theprojectionvectorsaswell asthe gainsandthresholds.
When a new aircraft-path subsystem(PV20) was designedfor operation in 20-ft/sec
turbulence,the standarddeviationsof the errorsobtainedat 20-ft/secwind gustsfor thetruth
modelwerenot largeenoughandhadto beincreasedto obtainadequatefalse-alarmperformance
at that turbulencelevel. Thus, the designprocedureat the higher turbulencelevelsneeds
refinementor themethodofobtainingparametervaluesfor thetruth modelneedsimprovement.
Nevertheless,afterthe truth modelwasadjusted,thePV20designperformedwell in 20-ft/sec
gusts.At thesehighergust levels,the baselineactuator-pathsubsystemalsoexperiencedsome
falsealarms.Redesignof the actuator-pathsubsystemwasnot pursuedbecauseit wasfelt that
if anadaptiveaircraft-pathsubsystemcouldbesuccessfullydeveloped,similartechniquescould
beeasilyappliedto the lesscomplexactuatorpath.
The designprocedurewasextendedto producean interpolateddesignfor operationovera
rangeofturbulencelevels.Thisdesignwasaccomplishedbylinearlyinterpolatingthethresholds,
gains,and projectionvectorsbetweentheir baseline,PV10,andPV20designvaluesbasedon
theFDI system'sknowledgeof the turbulencelevel.In the interpolateddesign,this knowledge
wassuppliedby the simulationuserbeforeeachrun as the specifiedvalueof the turbulence
standarddeviationfor that run. The interpolateddesignperformedwell overthe turbulence
rangeof 0 to 20 ft/sec, but the designwasimpractical,or incomplete,in that the required
knowledgeof theturbulencemagnitudeis unknownin flight operation.
A turbulenceestimatorwasdevelopedbasedon the techniqueusedin theNASAF-8 digital
fly-by-wireprogram.This techniqueestimatesthe samplestandarddeviationof the latest5sec
of turbulence.Thisestimatorwascombinedwith the interpolateddesignto produceanadaptive
aircraft-pathsubsystem.This adaptivedesignwasevaluatedin 0-, 5-, 10-,15-,and 20-ft/sec
turbulenceand performedwell overthe entirerange. It successfullydetectedand isolatedall
partiallymissingsurfacefailuresat 40-percenteffectiveness,andit detected19outof 20failures
at 60-percenteffectiveness.Only at the smallestfailuremagnitude(80-percenteffectiveness)
did performancedegrade.Furthermore,in 688secof simulationtime with no failures,therewas
only onefalsealarm.
Althoughthe decentralizedFDI techniqueis robustto smallmodelerrors,andtheextension
of the techniqueto anadaptivesystemallowsthesystemto operatein atmosphericturbulence,
problemsremainto besolvedin the developmentof anoperationalFDI system.Thetwomost
urgentneedsare (1) the continuationof the work reportedin NASACR-181664to extendthe
systemfrom a singleoperatingpoint to operationover the entire operatingenvelopeof the
aircraft, and (2) flight testing to provide more realistic noise, or error, values for the truth
models and to provide reliable false-alarm evaluation.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23665-5225
January 4, 1991
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Appendix
Time-History Plots From the Simulation
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